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Abstract
This work aims to present a number of low-complexity digital rights management
(DRM) methodologies for the H.264 standard. Initially, requirements to enforce
DRM are analyzed and understood. Based on these requirements, a framework
is constructed which puts forth different possibilities that can be explored to sat-
isfy the objective. To implement computationally efficient DRM methods, wa-
termarking and content based copy detection are then chosen as the preferred
methodologies.
The first approach is based on robust watermarking which modifies the DC
residuals of 4×4 macroblocks within I-frames. Robust watermarks are appropriate
for content protection and proving ownership. Experimental results show that the
technique exhibits encouraging rate-distortion (R-D) characteristics while at the
same time being computationally efficient.
The problem of content authentication is addressed with the help of two meth-
odologies: irreversible and reversible watermarks. The first approach utilizes the
highest frequency coefficient within 4×4 blocks of the I-frames after CAVLC en-
tropy encoding to embed a watermark. The technique was found to be very effect-
ive in detecting tampering. The second approach applies the difference expansion
(DE) method on IPCM macroblocks within P-frames to embed a high-capacity
reversible watermark. Experiments prove the technique to be not only fragile and
reversible but also exhibiting minimal variation in its R-D characteristics.
The final methodology adopted to enforce DRM for H.264 video is based on
the concept of signature generation and matching. Specific types of macroblocks
within each predefined region of an I-, B- and P-frame are counted at regular in-
tervals in a video clip and an ordinal matrix is constructed based on their count.
The matrix is considered to be the signature of that video clip and is matched
with longer video sequences to detect copies within them. Simulation results show
that the matching methodology is capable of not only detecting copies but also its
location within a longer video sequence. Performance analysis depict acceptable
false positive and false negative rates and encouraging receiver operating charac-
teristics. Finally, the time taken to match and locate copies is significantly low
which makes it ideal for use in broadcast and streaming applications.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The rapid growth of broadband Internet has led to the easy exchange digital
multimedia information. It takes just a few minutes or sometimes even seconds
to transfer digital multimedia data from one part of the globe to the other. In
addition, the easy availability of powerful computing resources and multimedia
software has made processing and editing of videos a very easy task. A person
does not need any special knowledge to process, edit and manipulate videos. This
means that digital video can be easily copied, manipulated and retransmitted. As
a result, copyrights could be violated and is a major issue with content production
companies. An analysis by LEK for Motion Picture Association in 2005 [1]
estimated that major motion picture studios lost $6.1 billion due to movie piracy
in 2005 and out this $2.3 billion was lost due to internet piracy. Of course, it
is safe to assume that this figure must be significantly higher at present. As a
result, content creators and providers are always searching for more secure methods
to distribute of their content online. The problem involves three factors: (1)
content protection and proof of ownership (2) content authentication and (3) copy
detection. Content protection implies that certain methodologies should be in
place that prevents any unauthorized copying of the content; while proving content
ownership means a technique which identifies the rightful owner of the content.
Content authentication has its significance in situations where it may be important
to verify that the content has not been edited, damaged or altered over a period of
time by an unauthorized user. Copy detection involves the use of methodologies to
detect the presence of a modified copy of an original video within a larger database,
within a broadcast or within a longer video sequence. For ease of discussion, from
this point on for the remaining part of this chapter, the term ‘protection’ would
be used to include all the above factors.
The severity of the issue has generated considerable interest in the research
community. Many different approaches have been suggested that address either
one or all of the factors mentioned above. Most of the approaches have been
1
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derived from the techniques that were used to protect digital content such as im-
ages and voice. But recently some techniques have been developed specifically
for video. This is so because video content has certain characteristics that set it
apart from other types of digital content. Unfortunately, it is these very charac-
teristics that make the development of protection mechanisms for video content
that much more difficult. For instance, video by nature has substantial redundant
information and even a part of this information can be used by pirates to create
satisfactory copies which bypass all copy detection mechanisms. In fact, newer and
more powerful techniques are emerging on a day-to-day basis that makes illegal
activities on videos a very mundane task.
1.1 Motivation
With piracy on the rise and illegal duplication of video content becoming very
common, content creators and owners are facing mounting losses. Digital data
pirates always seem to be a step ahead of even the latest and the most sophisticated
content protection techniques. Newer and stronger attacks are being launched that
render the protection mechanism useless. Content owners/creators not only need
a system that repels most of the attacks but also detects them; while at the same
time preserving the characteristics of the video.
The H.264 is the latest video standard rapidly being adopted for a number
of applications. Increasingly large amounts of content is now being encoded and
distributed under this standard. Correspondingly, more and more H.264-based
content is being illegally modified and copied. In addition, the standard is still
evolving with newer features being added to it. This, in turn, means that newer,
better and more secure protection algorithms need to be developed as the stand-
ard evolves. The high compression ratio offered by the standard means that the
encoded video is suitable for transmission even on low-bitrate channels. This
makes the task of developing a protection mechanism that much more difficult
since any modification to the encoder may result in an increase of the bitrate by a
significant amount thus defeating the very purpose of compression. A protection
system that guarantees only a minimal increase in bitrate is highly desirable. This
work would aim to address these requirements by analyzing those aspects of the
H.264 codec that can be utilized to design an efficient Digital Rights Management
(DRM) system. More specifically, the focus would be on maintaining an optimum
rate-distortion characteristic. This implies that a certain level of quality for the
video content would be maintained for a given bitrate even with the protection
mechanism in place.
Digital pirates could perform a variety of attacks on video data. That in-
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cludes making illegal copies, modifying the video content, claiming ownership etc.
Correspondingly, different methods have been developed to repel/detect these at-
tacks. Encryption, cryptographic hash algorithms and robust watermarks are used
to prevent video data from being copied illegally and to authenticate the content
as well as a legitimate user. Fragile, hybrid watermarks, content-based copy detec-
tion, on the other hand, are used for source/content authentication as well as to
detect modified copies of an original video data. However, most of the aforemen-
tioned techniques lead to an unacceptable processing and transmission overhead
when it comes to the H.264 standard. Thus the motivation behind this work was
to develop content protection mechanisms that do not compromise on the high
performance characteristics of the H.264 standard while at the same time offering
effective protection.
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives
As will be explained in Chapter 3, content protection, proof of ownership, content
authentication and copy detection are all aspects of a collective term known as
Digital Rights Management. However, DRM techniques based on encryption and
cryptographic hash algorithms are usually computationally complex and lead to a
significant computational overhead. This in unacceptable since the H.264 encoder
is in itself very complex and has a significant encoding time of its own. Burdening
the encoder by incorporating an encryption or a cryptographic algorithm would
significantly limit its application especially in situations where the bandwidth is
constrained and the receiving end devices are low-power portable devices.
Thus, within this study, watermarking and content-based copy detection (CBCD)
are explored as other possible viable alternatives to enforce DRM. The justifica-
tion for choosing these two approaches is the simple fact that not only are they
computationally efficient but also effective in enforcing both, content protection
and content authentication. But both aspects have conflicting requirements and
most of the algorithms proposed address either of the two. When it comes to wa-
termarking, an effective algorithm should be transparent, secure, computationally
efficient, unambiguous, and readily extractable. Transparency implies that the ef-
fect of the watermark on the host data should be negligible, at least perceptually.
Security implies that the strength of the watermarking system should rely on the
use of secret keys rather than obscuring the watermarking algorithm. A good wa-
termarking algorithm should not place a huge burden on computational resources
when it is executed. Unambiguity is a feature that allows unique identification of
the data owner. Easy extractability would permit the content owner/creator or a
legitimate user to easily extract the watermark.
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This purpose of this study is to develop watermarking techniques for DRM that
satisfy most of the requirements mentioned above. In addition, the performance
of the watermarking algorithms developed are evaluated for their effectiveness
by simulating a variety of attacks on the watermark. Their performance is also
compared against other existing algorithms. The comparisons are made in terms
of the degradation in the quality of the video after the watermark is embedded,
and the resulting increase in the bitrate. Again these are contradictory factors
and a balance has to be found that provides the best video quality at any given
bitrate.
CBCD methods consider certain features within the video itself as a “water-
mark” in order to detect copies. In line with developing computationally efficient
DRM methods, the aim is to look for such features within a video sample that
can be extracted efficiently and used as signatures to detect copies. The perform-
ance of the developed algorithm is checked under a variety of conditions such as
searching for copied video clips within a large video database or within a long
video sequence. Again the feasibility of the technique developed would depend on
performing the search and matching within a reasonable amount of time.
1.3 Problem Overview
A number of DRM algorithms have been proposed for video in general and H.264
in particular. However, most of these methods fail to take into account the novel
features incorporated within the H.264 standard. As a result, the techniques
reported may be quite efficient and effective for earlier video standards but fail to
maintain the same level of performance when applied to H.264 video. Therefore,
recently, a significant amount of research has been carried out which focuses on
developing DRM systems custom-made for this standard. This work also follows
the argument that to ensure that the developed DRM methodology does not have
an adverse effect on the performance of the H.264 codec, its functioning must be
thoroughly understood. To summarize, within this study, the problem of designing
computationally efficient DRM systems for the H.264 standard follows these steps:
1. Study the functioning of a typical DRM system and understand its require-
ments.
2. Understand and identify aspects of the H.264 standard that can be ex-
ploited to design computationally efficient DRM systems.
3. Design computationally efficient DRM enforcement methods based on the
aspects identified in step 2.
4. Evaluate the performance of the algorithms designed in step 3 and perform
a comparative evaluation with other similar reported methods.
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1.4 Scholarly Contribution
The proposed work thus divides the problem outlined in the previous section into
three broad categories of content protection/proof of ownership, content authen-
tication and copy detection. For each of these categories a different DRM method
is developed, simulated and tested for performance. Comparisons are made with
similar methods in order to verify the feasibility of the techniques developed. To-
wards the end of this study, the following systems are designed and proposed:
1. A computationally efficient robust watermarking system to enforce content
protection and to prove ownership.
2. A low-complexity irreversible fragile watermarking system. Such a system
would be effective in detecting modifications and tampering to the host
video content.
3. A reversible fragile watermarking system which would be effective in au-
thenticating a video content and/or its source. This method could also be
useful in areas where any permanent change to the host video is considered
unacceptable.
4. A computationally-efficient copy detection system based on the inherent
characteristics of the video content. Such a system would be useful in
tracking usage of a video content or for searching copies of a video within
a large database.
The above systems can be considered to be the main focus of study within this
work. In addition, development of these systems also involves analyzing the error
resilience of H.264 video under a various attacks since illegal modification/editing
of the video content by a digital pirate can be considered to be a problem of
transmitting video content over an error-prone transmission network. Developing
copy detection systems, in turn would involve studying those features within the
H.264 encoder that are independent of various signal processing operations.
During the course of this study, the following original contributions were made.
They are also included within the Bibliography.
Refereed Journal Publications:
1. M.A.Ali and E.A.Edirisinghe, “A semi-fragile watermarking technique for
H.264/AVC using CAVLC,” International Journal of Signal and Image Pro-
cessing, vol.1,No.3, Hypersciences, pp. 151-159, May 2010.
2. M.A.Ali and E.A.Edirisinghe, “Reversible watermarking using differential
expansion on IPCM macroblocks in H.264/AVC,” JNIT: Journal of Next
Generation Information Technology, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 105-116, 2011.
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3. M.A.Ali and E.A.Edirisinghe, “Watermarking H.264/AVC by modifying
DC coefficients,” in International Conference on Cyberworlds, (CW09),
(Bradford,UK), pp. 241-245, 7-11, Sept. 2009.
4. M.A.Ali and E.A.Edirisinghe, “Improved watermark payload capacity us-
ing DE on IPCM macroblocks in H.264/AVC,” in 5th International Con-
ference on Computer Sciences and Convergence Information Technology
(ICCIT10), (Seoul,South Korea), pp. 594-599, Nov.30-Dec.2, 2010.
5. M.A.Ali and E.A.Edirisinghe, “Multi-layer watermarking of H.264/AVC
video using differential expansion on IPCM blocks,” in IEEE International
Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE11), (Las Vegas,Nevada,USA),
pp. 53-54, Jan. 9-12, 2011.
Submitted Publications to Refereed Journals
6. M.A.Ali and E.A.Edirisinghe, “Multi-layer reversible watermarking for H.264/AVC
video.” Submitted to Signal Processing:Image Communication at Elseiver,
May 2011.
7. M.A.Ali and E.A.Edirisinghe, “Efficient spatiotemporal matching for video
copy detection in H.264/AVC video.” Submitted to IEEE Transactions on
Multimedia, May 2011.
1.5 Thesis Layout
For clarity in presentation, this thesis is arranged as follows: Chapter 2 explains
the H.264 standard and some of its novel features. This chapter also briefly ex-
plains those features that were exploited within this work in order to design DRM
systems. Chapter 3 introduces the concept of DRM in general and video con-
tent in particular. This chapter highlights the different aspects of DRM and the
various methodologies that could be employed to enforce each of these aspects.
Chapter 4 proposes a computationally-efficient DRM methodology for content pro-
tection and proof of ownership. This method is based on the robust watermarking
technique. An irreversible fragile watermarking system for hard content authen-
tication is introduced in Chapter 5. The performance of the designed algorithm
under various attacks is also studied. Chapter 6 presents a fragile watermarking
method that is reversible in nature. The need for DRM methods based on revers-
ibility; and an application scenario is also included within this chapter. Chapter 7
takes a different approach to DRM by proposing a method based on content-based
copy detection. This chapter also justifies the use of this method when compared
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to other methods such as watermarking. Conclusions are presented in Chapter
8 which highlights the contributions made within this work and also suggests a
list of improvements/modifications that can be explored further. Bibliography is
included at the end of the thesis.
Chapter 2
The H.264 Standard
This chapter presents an overview of the H.264 video coding standard developed
by the Joint Video Team. The overview discusses not only the functioning of the
standard in general but also highlights those features that have been exploited
within this work.
2.1 Overview
In early 1998, the Video Coding Experts Group (VCEG) ITU-T SG 16 Q.6 issued
a call for proposals on a project named H.26L. The aim was to double the coding
efficiency which effectively meant that for a given level of quality, the bitrate
would be halved in comparison to the video standards available at that time.
It was intended that the new standard would also cater to a large variety of
applications. The first draft design was adopted in October 1999. By December
2001, VCEG and the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) ISO/IEC JTC
1/SC 29/WG 11 formed a Joint Video Team (JVT), to finalize the draft of a new
video coding standard. In March 2003, the standard was formally approved as
H.264/Advanced Video Coding (AVC) [2, 3].Later,encouraged by the significant
improvements in video compression capability, in January 2005, the JVT also
standardized a Scalable Video Coding (SVC) [4] extension of the AVC. SVC is a
very attractive solution to the problems posed by the characteristics of modern
video transmission systems.
Since H.264 was designed for a large variety of applications ranging from con-
versational services on mobile networks to high quality video-on-demand, there
was a need for flexibility and customizability. In contrast to earlier video coding
standards, H.264 only defines the syntax of the encoded video bitstream and a
method to decode the bitstream. There is no standard encoder or decoder but
only compliant codecs. Nonetheless, most of the functional blocks of an H.264
8
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compliant codec are also present in earlier standards with the exception of the
deblocking filter. A simplified block diagram of the H.264 encoder and decoder is
shown in Fig.2.1. As can be seen, the encoder has a forward path and a recon-
struction path which is similar to that of the decoder.
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Fig.2.1:  Block Diagram of the H.264 : (a) Encoder  (b) Decoder 
 
In mobile telecommunications, the cost of transmitting and receiving streaming video can be reduced due 
to the resulting lower bitrate.  
Thus the standard offered an all-around improved performance and compression ratio. In order to 
ensure that the algorithms developed within work didn’t compromise on the performance of the above 
mentioned features, it was essential to understand their functioning. The following sections thus explain 
those features of the H.264 codec that were utilized in order to design the digital rights management 
algorithms.  
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slice is a set of macroblocks in raster scan order. Macroblocks can be I, P or B. I macroblocks are 
predicted using decoded macroblock samples from within the current slice. P and B macroblocks on the 
other hand, are predicted from slices belonging to previously coded pictures called reference picture(s). 
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igure 2.1: Block diagram of the H.264 CODEC
The enc d supports a number of features to ensure enhanced coding efficiency
and robustness to data errors/losses along with flexibility of pe ation over a
variety of network environm nts. Some of the notable features to ensure the above
characteristics are improved prediction methods, improved transform and entropy
encoding methods and a new bitstream syntax structure.
As a result of the improved performance, H.264 finds acceptance in a broad
spectrum of applications. For instance, the quality of television broadcast over
satellite can be improved significantly. In mobile telecommunications, the cost of
transmitting and receiving streaming video can be reduced due to the resulting
l wer bi rate.
Thus the standard offered an all-around improved performance and co pres-
sion ratio. In order to ensure that the algorit ms developed within this wo k did
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not compromise on the performance of the above mentioned features, it was es-
sential to understand their functioning. The following sections thus explain those
features of the H.264 codec that were utilized in order to design the digital rights
management algorithms.
2.2 Intraprediction
A coded picture consists of a number of macroblocks. These macroblocks are
arranged in slices where a slice is a set of macroblocks in raster scan order. Mac-
roblocks can be I, P or B. I macroblocks are predicted using decoded macroblock
samples from within the current slice. P and B macroblocks on the other hand,
are predicted from slices belonging to previously coded pictures named reference
picture(s). This section discusses the intraprediction methodology within H.264
while the next section discusses the features of interprediction.
Intraprediction [3] is one of the many new features incorporated in the H.264
standard in order to improve the compression efficiency. Unlike earlier stand-
ards which did not have any prediction within their I-frames, the H.264 standard
supports intraprediction which means that sample values of macroblocks within
I-frames are predicted from already transmitted neighboring macroblocks of the
same frame. The predicted macroblock block is normally termed as prediction
block P. The luminance values in P can be formed either using intra 4×4 or intra
16×16 block prediction mode. The intra 4×4 mode is used in the detailed and
high motion areas of the frame while the intra 16×16 mode is used in the smooth
and the stationary areas of the frame. There are a total of 9 prediction modes for
intra 4×4 luminance block, 4 modes for 16×16 luminance block and 4 modes for
the chrominance components. The different prediction modes and the direction
of prediction for a 4×4 luminance block are shown in Fig.2.2. Labels a-p are the
macroblocks that are to be predicted using previously encoded and reconstructed
blocks labelled,A-M [5].
In certain situations, not all samples from A-M may be available (for instance,
they might be a part of another slice). In such situations, only samples that are
available within the current slice are used for prediction. This allows independent
decoding of slices. Mode 2 (i.e. DC prediction) is modified depending upon which
samples from A-M are available, however other modes are chosen depending upon
the condition that the prediction blocks are available (within the same slice). The
only exception is when blocks E, F, G and H are not available in which case the
block values are copied from block D.
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(b) Prediction modes for luminance
Figure 2.2: Intraprediction modes for 4×4 macroblocks [5]
The choice of the prediction mode is made on the basis of the sum of absolute
errors (SAE). The H.264 encoder calculates the SAE for P under all the 9 modes
and chooses the mode with the smallest SAE as the best prediction mode.
As mentioned above, there are four modes for 16×16 intraprediction. These
are shown in Fig.2.3 below. Modes 0 to 2 are self explanatory while in mode
3, a linear ‘plane’ function is applied to the values obtained from the upper and
left-hand pixel samples (H and V respectively). This mode is most appropriate
for regions where the luminance varies smoothly.
Thus the H.264 standard supports a wide range of intra-prediction methods
for the I-frame. They improve the coding efficiency while at the same time main-
taining a good perceptual quality of the frame.
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Fig. 2.2:  4×4 intraprediction : (a) Labeling of macroblocks   (b) Prediction modes for luminance 
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Thus the H.264 standard supports a wide range of intra-prediction methods for the I-frame. They improve 
the coding efficiency while at the same time maintaining a good perceptual quality of the frame.  
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offers quarter sample resolution for the luminance component and one-eighth sample resolution for the 
chrominance components. This is done by applying interpolation to nearby coded samples. Fig.2.4. 
illustrates this concept. 
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Fig. 2.4: Inter-prediction of luminance components: (a) 4×4 in current frame  (b) Reference block: vector    
(1, -1)  (c) Reference block: vector (0.75, -0.75) 
 
In fig. 2.4(c), it can be seen that the actual pixel positions do not exist but in fact have been interpolated 
using nearby integral pixel positions.  
 As mentioned earlier, for block-based motion compensation, a variety of block-sizes are 
supported within the H.264 standard. For a P macroblock, luminance block sizes of 16×16, 16×8, 8×16 
and 8×8 are supported. When the 8×8 block size is chosen, an additional syntax element is transmitted 
which specifies whether the corresponding 8×8 block is further subdivided into partitions of 8×8, 8×4, 
4×8 or 4×4. This improves the accuracy of the motion-compensation block within the H.264 encoder. 
 In addition to the above mentioned macroblock types, a P macroblock can also be coded either in 
the SKIP mode or the DIRECT mode [5] . These modes work under the assumption that there is a high 
spatiotemporal correlation between the motion vectors of adjacent macroblocks or frames. The SKIP 
mode corresponds to the spatial correlation while the DIRECT mode corresponds to the temporal 
correlation. Under these modes, the motion information for the current macroblock is derived from 
previously encoded information corresponding to adjacent macroblocks or frames. This eliminates the 
need to transmit either the motion vector or the quantized prediction error but only the index numbers of 
the macroblocks/frames referred. P_skip macroblocks are very efficient and economical in depicting large 
areas with no change or slow constant motion such as panning.  
 B slices can be encoded and reconstructed similar to P slices, including the SKIP and the 
DIRECT mode. However, due to the bipredictive nature of B slices, motion vectors of a B macroblock 
could be pointing to two different references. These references are maintained as List 0 and List 1. Having 
two reference lists further improves performance.  
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Figure 2.4: In erprediction modes for luminanc components [5]
2.3 Interprediction
In additio to intraprediction, within P and B-fra es, some macr blocks are pre-
dicted using motion compensati n. For better pre ic ion accuracy, hes P ac-
roblocks a e furth r partitioned. Each mac oblock partition in a inter-coded
macroblock is predicted from an area of the same size in a previously encoded
reference picture using block-based motion compensation. The offset between the
two areas need not be exactly on the pixel resolution. H.264 takes into account
such a possibility and offers quarter sample resolution for the luminance compon-
ent and one-eighth sample resolution for the chrominance components. This is
done by applying interpolation to nearby coded samples. Figure 2.4 illustrates
this concept.
In Fig.2.4c, it can be seen that the actual pixel positions do not exist but in fact
have been interpolated using nearby integral pixel positions. As mentioned earlier,
for block-based motion compensation, a variety of block-sizes are supported within
the H.264 standard. For a P acroblock, luminance block sizes of 16×16, 16×8,
8×16 and 8×8 are supported. When the 8×8 block size is chose , an additional
syntax elem nt is transmit ed which specifies whether the c rresponding 8×8 block
is further subdivi ed into partitions of 8×8, 8×4, 4×8 or 4×4. This improves he
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accuracy of the motion-compensation block within the H.264 encoder.
In addition to the above mentioned macroblock types, a P macroblock can also
be coded either in the SKIP mode or the DIRECT mode [6]. These modes work
under the assumption that there is a high spatiotemporal correlation between the
motion vectors of adjacent macroblocks or frames. The SKIP mode corresponds
to the spatial correlation while the DIRECT mode corresponds to the temporal
correlation. Under these modes, the motion information for the current macrob-
lock is derived from previously encoded information corresponding to adjacent
macroblocks or frames. This eliminates the need to transmit either the motion
vector or the quantized prediction error but only the index numbers of the mac-
roblocks\frames referrred. P skip macroblocks are very efficient and economical
in depicting large areas with no change or slow constant motion such as panning.
B slices can be encoded and reconstructed similar to P slices, including the
SKIP and the DIRECT modes. However, due to the bipredictive nature of B slices,
motion vectors of a B macroblock could be pointing to two different references.
These references are maintained as List 0 and List 1. Having two reference lists
further improves performance. The copy detection method proposed in Chapter
7 is based on recognizing 4×4 intrapredicted macroblocks within the I-frames and
the P skip and B skip macroblocks within the P-and B-frames respectively.
2.4 Transform Coding
The resulting effect of spatiotemporal prediction, as shown in Fig.2.1 is the resid-
ual, Dn. This residual can be coded in 3 ways. The 4×4 array of luminance DC
coefficients obtained from 16×16 prediction and the 2×2 array of chrominance
DC coefficients are encoded using Hadamard transform. A DCT based transform
is applied on 4×4 blocks of residual data after motion compensated prediction or
intraprediction. The transform though based on the DCT has a few differences:
It is an integer transform i.e. all operations are carried out using integer arith-
metic without loss of decoding accuracy. Using integer arithmetic means that it is
possible to ensure zero mismatches between the encoder and the decoder inverse
transforms. The core part of the transform can be implemented using only addi-
tions and shifts. A scaling multiplication is integrated into the quantizer, reducing
the total number of multiplications. The inverse quantisation (scaling) and inverse
transform operations can be carried out using 16-bit integer arithmetic with only a
single multiply per coefficient, without any loss of accuracy. Finally, applying the
smaller 4×4 transform on macroblocks ensure better visual quality by reducing
the ringing effects around areas having high detail/texture. Further details about
the transform techniques implemented within the H.264 standard can be found
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in [3]. The robust watermarking technique proposed in Chapter 4 utilizes the DC
coefficients generated as a result of applying DCT transform on the 4×4 blocks of
residual data to embed the payload.
2.5 Entropy Encoding
The H.264 standard supports two types of entropy encoding: Context-based Ad-
aptive Binary Arithmetic Coding (CABAC) and Context-based Variable Length
Coding (CAVLC) [7]. Since the technique proposed in Chapter 5 proposes a fragile
watermark based on CAVLC, this section briefly outlines this technique. As the
name suggests, entropy encoding within CAVLC proceeds by taking into account
the context of the neighbouring blocks. It has a lower compression efficiency than
CABAC and is lossy but also has a lower computational complexity. The CAVLC
is used to encode the residual, zig-zag ordered 4×4 blocks of quantized coefficients.
There are a number of characteristics of such a block that CAVLC exploits:
1. The high frequency coefficients at the end of the zigzag scan are mostly
sequences of ±1. They are labelled as Trailing Ones(T1s).
2. Most of the coefficients of the block are zero after prediction, integer trans-
form and quantization.
3. The number of coefficients in a block is correlated to the number of coeffi-
cients in the neighbouring left-hand and upper previously encoded blocks.
4. The coefficients are larger at the start of the zig-zag scan and smaller to-
wards the end.
CAVLC takes advantage of these features by using run-level coding to com-
pactly represent a long sequence of zeroes. Also, the choice of VLC look-up table
to encode the values of the non-zero coefficients is adapted depending on recently-
encoded values. CAVLC proceeds to encode the block of quantized coefficients
(shown in Fig.2.5) as follows:
1. The coefficients are scanned in a zig-zag manner.
2. The total number of non-zero coefficients (TotalCoeffs) and the number
of T1s are encoded together as coeff-token i.e. coeff-token =TotalCoeffs+
T1s. TotalCoeffs can be between 0 to 16. T1s can be between 0 to 3.
If there are more than three T1s then they are assumed to be non-zero
coefficients.
3. A look-up table is used to encode coeff-token. The choice of the look-up
table depends on the number of non-zero coefficients in the left-hand (NL)
and upper (NU) previously encoded blocks. The NL and NU values are
used to evaluate N = (NL +NU)/2
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4. Depending on the value of N, there are four choices regarding the look-up
table as shown in Table 2.1. The first three are variable length code tables
while the last one is a fixed length code table.
5. The sign of the T1s is encoded as trailing ones sign flag.
6. The level (value) of the remaining non-zero coefficients is encoded as level
in the reverse order. Again the choice of VLC tables to encode each level
changes based on the magnitude of each successive coded level. There are
seven tables to choose from as shown in Table 2.2 and the choice of the
table is made in the following way:
(a) Start by choosing Level VLC0. However, if there are more than 10
coefficients and less than 3 T1s then initialize choice to Level VLC1.
(b) Encode the highest frequency non-zero coefficient using the chosen
VLC table.
(c) If the magnitude of this coefficient if higher than a pre-defined threshold,
choose the next VLC table.
7. The total number of zeroes after the first non-zero coefficient is encoded as
total zeroes.
8. The number of zeroes preceding a non-zero coefficient during a reverse zig-
zag scan is encoded as run-before in the reverse order with two exceptions:
(a) There are no more zeroes left to encode.
(b) run-before need not be encoded for the lowest frequency non-zero
coefficient
CAVLC entropy encoding
I Used to encode residual zig-zag ordered 4⇥4 blocks of quantized
coe cients
I Coe↵ token = TotalCoe↵s+T1s
where;
TotalCoe↵s = total number of non-zero coe cients
T1s = Trailing ones (between 0 and 3)
I The value of Coe↵ token is used to access a VLC look-up table
!
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Figure 2.5: An example of the CAVLC entropy encoding process
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Table 2.1: Choice of table look-up for coeff-token
N Table for coeff-token
0,1 Num-VLC0
2,3 Num-VLC1
4,5,6,7 Num-VLC2
8 or above FLC
Table 2.2: Threshold to increment choice of table to encode level
Current VLC Table Threshold to increment Table
Level-VLC0 0
Level-VLC1 3
Level-VLC2 6
Level-VLC3 12
Level-VLC4 24
Level-VLC5 48
Level-VLC6 N/A (highest table)
2.6 Bitstream Structure
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the H.264 standard only defines the syntax of the
H.264 encoded bitstream and a method to decode it. This essentially implies
that only the decoding process is “standardized” by imposing a restriction on
the syntax and the structure of the resulting bitstream. Such a restriction would
allow the encoding entity complete freedom and flexibility to configure the encoder
to conform to specific applications. The encoder could be tuned to produce an
encoded H.264 bitstream that has the right balance of quality, compression factor,
implementation cost etc. in order to suit the application. This also ensures that
every compliant decoder adhering to the standard would be able to decode an
encoded bitstream, if it has been constructed according to the syntax.
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Figure 2.6: Bitstream generation within the H.264 encoder
Since h H.264 st ndard w s meant o cater to a wide array of applications
over different networks, it was imperative to sig a syntactical struc ure hat
could handle this variety. To ensure adaptability and customizability, the actual
video content and its header information were separated into two different entities.
An H.264 encoded bitstream is basically composed of the Network Abstraction
Layer (NAL) and the Video Coding Layer (VCL). As Fig. 2.6 shows [3], the VCL
is the basic entity containing the actual video data which gets embedded within the
NAL. The NAL formats the VCL information and attaches a header to it which
contains control information pertaining to the video being encoded. In addition,
the purpose of the NAL is to represent the VCL and the header information in a
format that is suitable for transmission over a variety of transport layers and for
storage.
The NAL unit is a logical data packet within an H.264 bitstream. Each packet
contains an integral number of bytes. Within each NAL, the first byte is the header
byte which describes the payload within the NAL unit. The remaining bytes are
the payload as indicated by the header. The NAL structure may vary depending
on whether the encoded video is being transmitted over a packet- or bitstream-
oriented system. In a bitstream-oriented environment, it may be possible that
only a partial NAL unit has been delivered. In that case, it may be necessary
to identify NAL unit boundaries, not only for decoding but also for bitstream
alignment. This is usually achieved by prefixing each NAL unit with a 3 byte
code known as the start code prefix. They act as unique identifiers indicating
the start of a new NAL unit. In a packet-oriented environment, the underlying
protocol itself encapsulates the NAL units within a packet and attaches a unique
identifier. Thus NAL units do not need to carry a start code prefix.
NAL units are further classified as VCL or non-VCL units. As these terms
suggest, VCL NAL units contain data corresponding to video samples while the
non-VCL NAL units do not contain any video data. Rather they contain associ-
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ated additional information such as parameter sets that apply to a large number of
VCL NAL units and other supplementary information. This optional information
is not required to decode the video but can be used to enhance the usability of
the decoded video signal.
An access unit is a set of NAL units combined together in a specified form.
Decoding of each access unit gives one decoded picture. Thus each access unit
is self-contained i.e. all the NAL units within it compose what is known as a
primary coded picture. Within a primary coded picture, a set of VCL NAL units
can comprise a slice or a slice data partition that represents an independent part
of a video picture.
Finally, if the picture being coded is the last within a sequence then an end of
sequence NAL unit may be appended, however if the picture is the last within the
entire NAL unit stream then an end of stream NAL unit is appended to indicate
the end of the stream.
It is clear that the H.264 bitstream is designed around self-contained NAL
units. The concept of NAL units offers the facility to map the H.264 VCL data into
a variety of network transport protocols and file formats. This promotes flexibility,
simplicity, customizability and network friendliness of the resulting bitstream. A
more detailed discussion on the above concepts and other features can be found
in [8, 9].
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presented an outline of the H.264/AVC standard which was a joint
collaboration between ITU-T VCEG and the ISO/IEC organizations. The stand-
ard supports many notable features that distinguish it from earlier standards
including an enhanced and more accurate motion prediction, smaller block size
integer-based transform and context-adaptive entropy encoding. The VLC based
bitstream also makes the standard very flexible, network friendly and customiz-
able. It has been claimed in [3] that the usage of these novel features can lead to a
savings of up to 50% in the resulting bitrate for a comparable perceptual quality
with reference to earlier standards.
However, the methodologies adopted to implement these features within the
H.264 encoder make it very complex. From the point of the view of designing DRM
systems for the standard, this becomes a drawback since any modification to the
encoder in order to incorporate a DRM algorithm might make it more intricate and
also compromise on its compression efficiency. Thus it is important to understand
the functioning of these novel features so as to design DRM systems that do not
have a significant detrimental impact on the performance of the standard.
Chapter 3
Digital Rights Management
This chapter discusses the concept of Digital Rights Management (DRM) when
applied to digital content in general and then attempts to build a framework
for video content in particular. Towards the end of the chapter, justification is
provided for choosing some frameworks over others.
3.1 General Overview
Digital Rights Management (DRM) is an access control methodology that is em-
ployed by content creators/owners to protect and authenticate their content. DRM
refers to the protection, distribution, modification, and enforcement of the rights
associated with the use of digital content. The primary responsibilities of a DRM
system include secure delivery of content, prevention of unauthorized access, en-
forcement of usage rules, and monitoring of the use of content [10, 11]. Usually,
enforcing DRM would involve granting digital licenses rather than buying digital
content. The license would dictate rules regarding the usage of the content such
as frequency of access, view-by date, transfer constraints, restrictions on modific-
ations and making copies. A basic DRM model would normally consist of four
entities: the content provider, the distributer, the clearinghouse and the consumer.
It is the content provider who usually decides the steps to enforce DRM. These
steps could be taken either to protect the digital content, verify ownership or to
authenticate content. Similarly, detection methods could be used by the content
provider/distributer to verify copies of the original video content.
As explained in [10], a basic DRM system would have a set-up as shown in Fig.
3.1. Mostly, the content creator and distributor are a single entity hence broadly
speaking; a DRM process model could have three entities. A content creator who
creates the content and applies the DRM rule , a license creator who creates the
license and attaches it to the content and finally the consumer who complies with
19
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the license and goes on to consume the content.
A DRM process model works as follows: The content creator encodes and
encrypts the digital content prior to distribution. The protected content is made
available via a content distribution server. The license is created, attached to
the content and made available by the license creator for consumption. A would-
be consumer would download the content from the distribution server but would
require a license to be able to decrypt the content and view it. The consumer would
then request the license creator for a license. The license creator would identify
and record the user and then charge him depending upon his usage request. After
completion of the payment, the license creator would provide the consumer with a
specific code that would decrypt the content. The user completes the transaction
by decrypting and viewing the content. In certain cases, the license may be granted
prior to or even simultaneously with the content. This approach could be more
appropriate in situations where the consumer is encouraged to sample the content
before the actual purchase.
DRM can be enforced using a number of mechanisms, as shown in Fig. 3.2, or
in certain situations even a combination of these. For example, the video content
could first be encrypted and then hashed using a cryptographic hash algorithm.
At the receiving end, the hash would be used to match the digital signature of
the encrypted video in order to verify its authenticity. After this verification, the
video content is decrypted. Similarly, CBCD methods could be employed to detect
and locate copies of an original video in a large video database or a longer video
sequence. A robust watermark could then be used to claim ownership.
This chapter discusses the concept of content protection, proof of ownership,
content/source authentication, and copy detection and how they are enforced using
the methodologies shown in the figure below. Interestingly,cryptographic hash
algorithms can be employed to enforce either of the two DRM mechanisms, as
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depicted in Fig.3.2.
Encryption and cryptographic hashing are related and but are often incor-
rectly used interchangeably. However, both of them produce an encrypted form of
the original data that has to be decrypted before consumption and are therefore
mo e ppropriate for content protecti n. Wat rmarking and CBCD methods in
contrast, r tain the perceptual form of the original dat and are more useful for
content authentication. The following se tions present a brief discussio of these
methods when applied to video data.
3.2 Encryption
Video content encryption, termed as video scrambling prevents access to the con-
tent by distorting the video data such that it appears unintelligible to a viewer
without prior descrambling. Descrambling can be done by compliant decoders
which recognize the code before playback. Descrambling can also be performed if
the viewer has the appropriate key which he/she can use to decrypt the video at
the receiver end and view the content. However, this method involves extensive
key management and distribution where unique keys have to be made available to
each and every user. A basic encryption mechanism for video is shown in Fig.3.3
Some of the earliest methods to encrypt video can be found in [12, 13]. How-
ever, encryption as a content protection mechanism immediately runs into prob-
lems. Scrambling of video data is usually done in the spatial domain. This would
drastically modify its statistical properties making it very difficult to compress.
The obvious way out would be to compress the data prior to scrambling as pro-
posed in [14–17] and depicted in Fig.3.3. Further, encrypting the data and then
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Figure 3.3: Techniques employed to enforce DRM
decrypting it before playback would lead to a significant processing overhead since
cryptographic algorithms are usually complex computationally. In fact, decom-
pression and real-time delivery of TV or cinema quality digital video in itself is a
very challenging problem and constitutes its own area of research. Finally, the high
computational complexity makes encryption algorithms unsuitable for low-power
portable devices.
However, attempts have been made to design computationally efficient video
encryption algorithms. In the context of H.264 video, there are a few methods
worth mentioning. Zou et al. [18] proposed an encryption scheme which functions
during the entropy encoding stage of the H.264 encoder. They partially encrypt the
slice data and claim to preserve the network-friendliness and compression efficiency
of the standard. Park and Shin [19] propose a selective encryption scheme wherein
they only encrypt the intraprediction modes, the motion vector difference values
and the sign bits of the texture data. They claim that their algorithm remains
lightweight. There are a few other methods that encrypt H.264 video data in the
compressed domain. Iqbal et al. [20] proposed a scheme wherein they selectively
encrypt slice data partitions within the H.264 bitstream. Depending upon the level
of encryption desired, higher or lower number of slices are chosen to be encrypted.
They also claim that this selective encryption reduces the computational overhead.
It is clear that the advantages that can be offered by video scrambling methods
are limited by the constraints of their own computational complexity. Particularly,
when it comes to streaming video content over bandwidth-constrained networks
and viewing them using low-power portable devices, encryption becomes a very
significant hindrance.
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3.3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithms
In cryptographic hashing, a hash function based on a cryptographic algorithm is
applied to a variable-sized digital content in order to generate a smaller fixed-size
hash value. This hash value is unique and serves as a fingerprint for the digital
content. Further, these hash values are extremely sensitive. A change of even a
single bit in the original content will change the resulting hash value. This makes
them very effective in detecting changes to the original data. The working of a
cryptographic hashing system is shown in Fig.3.4 where the underlined alphabet
depicts the difference in each of the data files.
As can be seen, a change of even a single alphabet leads to different hash
values. A typical cryptographic hashing system thus, should have the following
properties:
1. For any given cryptographic hash function H and data d, it should be
straightforward to calculate h = H (d) where h is the hash value. However,
for a given h, it should be very difficult to find d such that h = H (d).
2. For any given data d, if the hash value is h; then modifying d to d ′ should
also lead to h ′.
3. For any two data sets d1 and d2, if d1 6= d2; then always H(d1) 6= H(d2)
The first property is termed as preimage resistance while the second and third
properties are termed as collision resistance [21]. However, the high sensitivity of
hash values, as pointed out in the second and third properties turn into a draw-
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back when it comes to data that has a lot of redundancy, such as multimedia data.
For instance, a raw video and its compressed version would be very different in
terms of their binary data but are similar perceptually. In such cases, obtaining
different hash values for both them is clearly meaningless. Thus hashing method-
ologies that are capable of generating same hash values for perceptually similar
video content but at the same time capable of detecting more drastic changes are
required. This category of hashing methods is termed as robust or perceptual
hashing systems [22]. Initial video hashing methods had their roots in hashing
systems designed for images. In these methods, the hashing function was ap-
plied frame-by-frame. It is obvious that these methods are unable to exploit the
temporal redundancies present in video and hence would be vulnerable against
temporal resynchronization, frame rate change and frame dropping etc.
A few perceptual methods have however been proposed that deal specifically
with hashing video data by taking into account the spatio-temporal characterist-
ics. Oostveen et al. [23] designed a method to obtain a video hash by applying
2×2 spatiotemporal Haar filters on the randomized block means of the lumin-
ance component. Coskun et al. [22] proposed two video hashing methods based
on DCT. One of them was based on the classical basis set while the other was
based on the randomized basis set. Even though they claim robustness against
signal processing attacks and transmission errors; they also admit that the former
method lacks security since different video samples may give the same hash value
and thus result in a collision. Collision usually happens if the hash function is
not well designed, and would result in flagging false positives when it comes to
detecting copies.
Recently a few hashing algorithms have been designed specifically for H.264
video. These hashing algorithms would be robust to underlying changes made to
the content by the H.264 encoder. Ramaswamy and Rao [24] proposed a hard
video authentication and sender verification algorithm based on a cryptographic
hash. They extract the DC and the first two quantized AC frequency coefficients
from every macroblock within every frame of a GOP. These are then hashed to
generate a fingerprint for that GOP. They claim that this would produce a unique
fingerprint for every GOP and thus would capture the spatio-temporal charac-
teristics of the video sequence. Wang et al. [25] proposed a scheme wherein the
encryption keys are generated based on a cryptographic hash function. They en-
crypted the intraprediction mode, the motion vector difference and the quantized
coefficients. A hash function was then applied to the encrypted data to produce
a hash value. They claimed that the proposed scheme is efficient computationally
and the encryption/hashing process hardly affects the resulting video quality.
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3.4 Drawbacks of Encryption and
Cryptographic Hash Algorithms
From the above discussion, the underlying fact to emerge is that encryption and
cryptographic algorithms will almost always lead to a processing overhead and
time delay when it comes to transmission and playback of video data. A DRM
system based on encryption/cryptographic hash algorithms can suffer from one or
all of the following drawbacks:
1. Require a strong mathematical foundation in order to design an effective
system.
2. The security of the techniques depend solely on the key that encrypts the
data. It is usually said, “Lose the key and you effectively lose the data”,
since there is no alternative to recovering the data without decrypting it
using the key that was used to encrypt it.
3. Cryptographic hash algorithms are very sensitive. Even a change of a single
bit is enough to change the hash value. This makes them ineffective for
multimedia data wherein the raw data may be drastically different (due to
compression or other operations) but is perceptually similar.
4. They are computationally very demanding and will almost always consume
a significant amount of computing resources when in execution.
5. Encryption is not effective in protecting content after it has been decrypted.
An authorized user, after decrypting the video can easily modify, duplicate
and re-distribute the video. A similar problem can also be foreseen in the
context of authentication.
6. Integration of a cryptographic algorithm to an existing system is usually
quite difficult. This means that implementing a cryptographic algorithm on
an existing system mostly leads to unwanted side effects such as affecting
operational performance.
It is clear that the encryption and cryptographic hash algorithms are inefficient
when it comes to enforcing DRM for video in general and H.264 video in particular.
This is due to the fact that the H.264 standard is widely used for streaming video
applications on devices running on limited power and computing resources. This
constraint, in itself, is enough to make these DRM approaches unfeasible.
Watermarking, in turn, provides a better alternative for content protection and
authentication in the context of H.264. Since a watermark is embedded within
the video content and effectively becomes a part of it, it is permanent. Even after
the video content has been authenticated and an authorized owner identified, the
watermark is still a part of the content. In addition, a watermark can be embedded
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in such a way that it can not only provide authentication and protection but also
indicate attacks and tampering on the video content. Watermarking techniques
are also generally computationally efficient and do not place a burden on the
video codecs. Similarly, CBCD methods exploit characteristics that are inherently
unique to video content in order to detect copies. No external methods/techniques
are required in order to match and locate copies. Again, this fact makes CBCD
much more feasible for H.264 video as compared to encryption and hashing.
Thus, watermarking and CBCD methods are more viable alternatives to im-
plementing DRM, specially for H.264 video. These two methods are discussed in
the following sections.
3.5 Watermarking
Watermarking is a class of data embedding technique wherein the data to be em-
bedded has a close relationship with the host i.e. the content it is being embedded
into. In the context of images and videos, the relationship could be in the form
of pixel values in the spatial domain, the transform method used, quantization
parameter value or the entropy encoding method used to compress the host. How-
ever, embedding the watermark inevitably leads to distortions and introduction
of artifacts. Usually, higher the watermark payload, higher will be the amount
of distortion introduced. Thus it is highly desirable that distortion/artifacts in-
troduced as a result of the embedding should be at least, visually imperceptible.
Consequently, human visual model systems could be employed to reduce the effect.
However the underlying fact is that since the watermark is embedded within the
digital content and effectively becomes a part of it; it is permanent. Even after the
content has been authenticated and an authorized owner identified, the watermark
is still remains an integral part of the content. A watermark can be embedded in
such a way that it can not only provide authentication and protection but also
indicate attacks and tampering on the video content. Watermarking techniques
are also less complex computationally.
Watermarking as a technique to prove ownership was proposed for the first
time more than 60 years ago [26]. Since then watermarking algorithms have been
employed to protect all kinds of data, multimedia or otherwise. Mathematically,
any watermarking algorithm for images/video can be defined as:
IW = IO +W
where IO is the original information vector that can be pixel values, transformed
coefficients or any other information about the content. IW is the watermarked
information vector while W is the watermark to be embedded. As can be seen from
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the above equation, the watermark signal is considered to be the difference between
the original content and the watermarked content, no matter how it actually gets
embedded. A simplified model of a typical video watermarking system is shown
in Fig.3.5.
As can be seen from Fig.3.5, in contrast to encryption (see Fig.3.3), the water-
marked video retains its perceptual form. In fact, watermarking digital content
involves taking into consideration several factors. It involves tradeoffs between
the amount of modification made to the data on one hand and the degree of im-
munity to host signal attacks and visual quality degradation on the other. A large
amount of signal modification can often lead to significant degradation in the host
signal which is obviously not desirable. Thus it is essential that the modification
be made to the host data up to a certain level so that the watermark is extrac-
ted/detected within the desired error probabilities. This is largely referred to the
rate-distortion characteristics (R-D) in literature. Usually, optimum R-D charac-
teristics are obtained by deciding the domain in which the watermark algorithm
is to function. Domains are classified as: spatial domain/pixel domain, transform
domain/frequency domain or the compressed/bitstream domain.
Spatial domain watermarking techniques directly modify the pixel values/
sample points of the digital content. Some of the earliest algorithms based on
this technique are presented in [27–30]. Transform domain watermarking tech-
niques embed the watermark after DCT, DFT or wavelet operations on digital
data. Some frequency coefficients in the transform domain are selected to carry
the watermark. The selection is made under a watermarking rule. Some very
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popular frequency domain watermarking techniques have been reported in [31–33].
Compressed domain watermarking algorithms are designed to perform embedding
after the quantization and entropy encoding stage. At this stage the quantized
frequency coefficients are encoded as variable length codes (VLCs) and fed into
the bitstream. The watermarking algorithm thus modifies the bitstream to embed
the watermark. Compressed domain techniques are relatively newer than spatial
and transform domain techniques. Some landmark compressed domain techniques
are presented in [34,35].
Depending on the way the watermark is inserted and depending on the nature
of the watermarking algorithm, the watermark detection method can take on
two approaches. In the first approach, the watermark has to be extracted in its
exact form. This is referred to as ‘watermark extraction’. In the second scheme,
it may only be necessary (or possible) to detect whether a specific watermark
signal is present. This is referred to as ‘watermark detection’. Both of these
approaches have their own application domains [36]. The first approach finds
use in authentication systems. In such a system, a robust cryptographic hash
function of the host content is computed and the resulting value is embedded as the
watermark. To authenticate the watermark, the embedded hash value is extracted
and compared against the computed hash value. A difference in hash values would
mean the content has been modified. The second approach finds usage in areas
such as broadcast monitoring stations. In this scenario, a monitoring station might
be set up by a broadcast company, the purpose of which would be to check if the
local stations broadcast their content without paying the relevant charges. This
can be done by only detecting the presence of a watermark. There is no need to
actually extract the watermark.
In situations where the watermark is to be extracted rather than detected,
there are again two possibilities. The first possibility is that the original content is
also sent across to the receiver side, possibly via a secure channel, and is compared
with the watermarked and possibly corrupted content. The difference between the
two contents is effectively the watermark. Such a technique is referred to as in-
formed watermarking. But this technique is not always practical. First of all,
the content owner may not want to distribute the unwatermarked content just to
check the existence of the watermark. Secondly, it makes the overall system more
complicated since the watermarked content may require some pre- processing be-
fore a comparison can be made. For instance, translation, rotation angles and
scale factors may need to be adjusted; error correction may be required and so
on. The second possibility is to have a technique that does not need the original
content to extract the watermark. Such a technique is called a ‘blind’ watermark-
ing technique and works by using a secret key to identify the watermark. Usually,
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the key is the same as that used to embed the watermark. Blind watermarking
techniques are more practical, have a lower complexity and hence preferred over
informed watermarking techniques. A few informed watermarking techniques are
reported in [37, 38] while some of the earlier blind watermarking techniques can
be studied in [39,40].
Watermarking techniques are also classified as robust or fragile. Robust wa-
termarking is more suited for content protection and copyright ownership while
fragile watermarking is more appropriate for content authentication. There is also
a third category of semi-fragile watermarks. As the name suggests, semi-fragile
watermarks are somewhere in between robust and fragile. Such watermarks are
sensitive to most of the attacks but are resistant to common processing tasks such
as compression.
It should now be apparent that robust watermarks are the preferred means of
protecting video content. To authenticate video content however, fragile water-
marks are more appropriate. They are designed in such a way that they get altered
or distorted even under the most common signal processing operations. A per-
turbed watermark is an indication that the host data has been altered, damaged
or modified by an unauthorized user. Video content containing a damaged wa-
termark will thus fail the authentication process. Fragile watermarks have found
wide-spread acceptance in areas such as protecting images archived in a data-
base [41, 42] and applications where the aim is to ensure that the image or the
video has not been fabricated to falsify events, such as in news agencies [43]. A
few other applications include medical images and forensics, legal evidence and
espionage [44].
Fragile watermarks usually compete with cryptographic hash-based signature
systems. However, fragile watermarks offer two distinct advantages over hash
algorithm-based authentication systems. First, the watermark becomes a part
of the host data in contrast to being an additional data set. Secondly, hash
signature-based authentication systems can detect alterations but cannot identify
the location of the alterations. In contrast, fragile watermarks can not only detect
that the host data has been altered but also highlight the tampered locations.
However, the fact cannot be overlooked that watermarking essentially involves
modification of the host data. This fact can sometimes be unacceptable or plain
impractical. In such situations, content-based copy detection methods offer a
better alternative.
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3.6 Content-Based Copy Detection
Content-based copy detection (CBCD) is another method to protect digital con-
tent. Generally, multimedia data contains enough unique information that can
serve as its fingerprint in order to identify it. The fingerprint can be used to
detect copies, either within a large database or in case of video, within a longer
video clip as well. A basic CBCD system is shown in Fig. 3.6.
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As can be seen, no additional information is required, in contrast to encryp-
tion and watermarking, in order to enforce DRM. The most popular statement in
support of CBCD systems is that “the m dia itself is the aterm rk”. Anoth r
added advantage is that the signature need not be extracted before the media
is actually distributed as was the case in watermarking. Finally, since no addi-
tional processing is required, CBCD methods are computationally efficient which
makes them suitable for applications where computing resources are limited or at
a premium. Usually CBCD methods are complimentary to watermarking. For
instance, after the CBCD based method detects illegal copies, the rightful owner
of the content can use a watermark in order to prove ownership.
CBCD methods were initially proposed for images with the most straightfor-
ward method being correlation-based, which calculated the sum of pixel differ-
ences [45]. As the term suggests, this method calculates the difference between
two images pixel-wise. More formally, given an image A and its copy B with
pixel intensity values {I1A, I2A, ...., InA} and {I1B, I2B, ...., InB} respectively, the copy
detection mechanism would calculate a correlation-based distance parameter D
as:
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D =
n∑
i=1
| I iA − I iB |
n
D is then compared to a specified threshold value. A value of D lesser than
the threshold would indicate a copy. However, it is clear that matching each pixel
intensity value will be computationally intensive. The obvious way to make it more
efficient would be to match average intensities of each corresponding macroblock
rather than each pixel. However, simple matching of pixel intensities is not a
robust copy detection mechanism simply due to the fact that even a single outlier
pixel or block value can render the detection mechanism ineffective. Further, non-
linear intensity variation within pixel or block values also makes the technique
unsuitable.
Consequently many other methods were proposed in order to overcome these
drawbacks. They were based on wavelet-transforms [46], colour histogram inter-
section [47] etc. However, one of the most effective methods to emerge in recent
years is based on ordinal measures. This method, originally proposed in [48], works
by dividing an image into n×n equal-sized regions and then calculating the aver-
age intensity within each region. The division makes the method independent of
input image size. The average intensities obtained from each region are arranged
ordinally in a one-dimensional rank matrix which acts as the signature for the
image. This rank matrix was found to be independent of most signal processing
operations and was thus effective in detecting copies of images that had under-
gone operations like changes in luminance, contrast, sharpening, median filtering,
image resizing, letter- and pillar-box etc. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 depict an example of
this methodology.
As can be seen, irrespective of the change in luminance of the image, the
method generates the same ordinal matrix and hence the signature as the ori-
ginal image. This makes the technique very effective in detecting modified copies.
This method was adopted by many other copy detection approaches such as the
one proposed in [45] wherein the ordinal ranking matrix was generated for DCT
coefficients and found to be more effective than simple ordering of intensity values.
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Figure 3.7: Ordinal signature generation for an original image
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D is then compared to a specified threshold value. A value of D lesser than the threshold would indicate a 
copy.  Matching each pixel intensity value can still be computationally intensive, though it can be made 
more efficient by matching average intensities of each corresponding macroblock rather than each pixel. 
However, simple matching of pixel intensities is not a robust copy detection mechanism simply due to the 
fact that even a single outlier pixel or block value can render the detection mechanism ineffective. 
Further, non-linear intensity variation within pixel or block values also makes the technique unsuitable.  
 Consequently many other methods were proposed in order to overcome these drawbacks. They 
were based on wavelet-transforms [42], colour histogram intersection [43] etc. However, one of the most 
effective methods to emerge in recent years is based on ordinal measures. This method, originally 
proposed in [89], works by dividing an image into n×n equal-sized regions and then calculating the 
average intensity within each region. The division makes the method independent of input image size. 
The average intensities obtained from each region are arranged ordinally in a one-dimensional rank 
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D is then compared to a specified threshold value. A value of D lesser tha  the thres ld would indicate a 
copy.  Matching each pixel intensity value can still be computationally intensive, though it can be made 
m re efficient by atching average intensities of each corresponding macroblock rather than each pixel. 
However, simple matching of pixel intensities is not a robust copy detection mechanism si ply due to the 
fact that even a single outlier pixel or block value can render the detection mechanism ineffective. 
Further, n -linear intensit  variation within pixel or block values also makes the technique unsuitable.  
 Consequently many ther methods were proposed in order to overcome these drawbacks. They 
were based on wavelet-transfor s [42], colour histogram intersection [43] tc. However, one of the most 
effective methods to emerge n recent years is based on ordinal easures. This meth d, originally
propos d in [89], works by dividing an image i to n×n equal-size  regions and then calcul ting the 
average intensity within each r gion. The division m kes the metho  indepe dent of input image size. 
The average intensities obtained fr m each region are arranged ordinally in a one-dimensional rank 
matrix which acts as the signature for the image. This rank matrix was found to be indepen ent of most 
signal processing operations and was thus effective i  detecting copies of images that had undergo e 
operations like changes in luminance, contrast, sharpening, median filtering, image resizing, letter- and 
pillar-box etc. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 depict an example of this methodology.   
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Fig. 3.7:  Ordinal signature generation (a) Original image div ded into 2×2 blocks  (b) Average intensity of 
each block  (c) Ordinal Matrix  
Fig. 3.8:  Ordinal signature generation (a) Copied image with reduced luminance    (b) Average intensity of 
each block (c) Ordinal Matrix  
(c) Ordinal matrix
Figure 3.8: Ordinal signature generation for a copied image with reduced
luminance
The effectiveness of this method in detecting copies of images implies that it
can be modified to detect copies of video sequences as well. In fact, a number of
approaches have been developed as can be found in [49–54]. The copy detection
method proposed in Chapter 7 is also based on this approach.
3.7 Conclusion
Techniques to protect content from unauthorized copying and proving ownership
have been around for close to 70 years now. However it is only recently that they
have assumed a much more significant role. Enforcing DRM could be achieved
using a number of techniques that include encryption, cryptographic hash al-
gorithms, watermarking and CBCD. However, this chapter showed that when it
comes to protecting video data, the first two, though quite effective, suffer from a
number of drawbacks. This makes them impractical to be implemented for a num-
ber of applications, for instance when accessing streaming video over portable and
handheld devices. In such application scenarios, watermarking and CBCD meth-
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ods offer a better alternative. Watermarking, as a technique, has been proven to
be effective in not only protecting video content and proving ownership but also in
detecting unauthorized modification and tampering. CBCD-based methods have
been found to be very effective in detecting copies of video, not only within a large
database but also in detecting copies of short video clips in longer video sequences.
This approach is very useful in tracking the usage of video content. CBCD differ
from other methods in that they not require any supplementary information to
detect copies.
As pointed out in Section 3.4, besides the distinct advantages offered by wa-
termarking and CBCD methods, there is one more reason due to which it was
decided to focus this work on developing DRM techniques based on them. Since
the H.264 standard was chosen as the platform on which the algorithms would
be tested, it was important to keep in mind its application domain. This stand-
ard also supports streaming video over cellular networks which mean that it is
designed to work in a bandwidth constrained environment and on devices having
limited computing resources. Thus it was important that the DRM techniques
developed are not only effective but also computationally efficient. Consequently,
the following chapters propose DRM techniques for H.264 video based only on
watermarking and CBCD.
Chapter 4
Robust Watermarking
This Chapter presents a method for content protection and to prove ownership
of digital media. These aspects are realized by employing a novel method of em-
bedding a robust watermark within an H.264/AVC coded video. The proposed
method works in the transform domain by embedding the watermark in the re-
sidual DC values of the 4×4 intra-prediction blocks. The DC values that are
to contain the watermark bits are chosen randomly. The set of random values
that are used to select the DC values are considered to be the ‘key’. This key is
made available at the receiver side in order to extract the watermark and verify
ownership. Experimental results show that the technique is transparent with min-
imal effect on the host video sequence. Further, since only the DC coefficients
are utilized to contain the watermark, the embedded watermark is resistant to
compression and other similar modifications.
4.1 Introduction
Robust watermarking systems work towards preventing unauthorized users from
destroying the secret code that has been embedded within the multimedia inform-
ation in order to uniquely identify it. Robust watermarking systems usually come
under two categories of attacks, termed as fair or unfair attacks. Attacks that
make use of publicly available information, such as the algorithm used to embed
the watermark, are termed as fair attacks while those that attempt to extract
secret information such as the key used to embed the watermark, are termed as
unfair attacks. Robust watermarking systems are expected to withstand fair at-
tacks and degrade graciously under unfair attacks. Thus, it is imperative that
the amount of information to be kept secret has to be minimal. Usually, the only
information to be kept secret is the watermark embedding and extraction method-
ology i.e. the key. The algorithm and its domain of functioning are usually made
34
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public.
More recently, maintaining transparency while embedding a watermark is as-
suming as much significance as robustness. This is due to the fact that even the
most robust watermarking systems have a high probability of being compromised
under certain powerful attacks such as collusion. Collusion attacks are a more
serious problem when it comes to video and audio signals. There are two types
of collusion attacks. If the same watermark is embedded in different data, the
watermark data can be estimated from each occurrence and the average of those
estimates will be a refined estimate. If different watermarks are embedded in the
same data, several users can collude by averaging their decoded signals to reduce
the strength of the watermark and possibly render it unreadable. If the same
watermark is embedded in all the frames, the first type of collusion can be used to
remove the watermark from different scenes. If a different watermark is embedded
in each frame, the second type of collusion can be used to remove the watermark
from correlated scenes.
Transparency ensures that the hacker/cracker does not suspect that the digital
content is watermarked and hence doesnt think of launching attacks to remove the
watermark. One of the easiest methods to maintain high transparency is by per-
forming watermark embedding in the same spectral components as that of the host
data. This usually involves the mid and the low frequencies. But the drawback
of most transform based techniques is that they involve the host in the detection
process, which may not be feasible in all situations and applications. In addition,
frequency domain watermark embedding techniques are not very robust. Even re-
latively weak attacks such as filtering and compression can lead to a considerable
loss of the watermark data. Loss of watermark information due to unintentional
attacks such as compression is highly undesirable since compression is one of the
most essential video/image processing step and is widely applied on almost all di-
gital media. This Chapter thus presents a robust transform domain watermarking
technique that is not only transparent but also robust against compression.
4.2 Literature Survey
Since many standards such as JPEG, MPEG, H.263 and H.264 make use of the
DCT, many watermarking algorithms have been proposed that work in the DCT
domain. One of the first algorithms was proposed by Koch et al. [55]. They used a
pair of mid frequency coefficients to embed a watermark bit. Bors and Pitas [56]
proposed modifying the mid range DCT coefficients using linear DCT constraint
or a circular DCT detection region. The selection of the frequency components
was done using a Gaussian network classifier. Frequency masking of DCT blocks
CHAPTER 4. ROBUST WATERMARKING 36
was proposed as a watermarking technique by Smith and Comisky [56] as well
as by Swanson et al. [57].These techniques of watermark embedding in the DCT
coefficients has been extended to H.264 AVC video standard as well.
Video watermarking is done taking into account the three factors of payload,
quality and robustness. These are conflicting requirements and a tradeoff is made,
usually by concentrating on one of them more than the other two. Noorkami and
Mersereau [58] proposed a method wherein the watermark is embedded in the
quantized AC residuals of the luma component of 4×4 intra-predicted macrob-
locks. Their technique embedded one watermark bit per quantized AC residual.
The security of the algorithm is based on the randomness of the selected blocks.
Wu et al. [59] proposed a blind watermarking technique which used a pair of
predicted DCT coefficients within 4×4 blocks to embed 1-bit of a watermark.
The embedding locations of DCT coefficients are switched from lower to higher
subbands in a predefined order. Meerwald and Uhl [60] developed a robust water-
marking framework for H.264/SVC wherein they add pseudo-random watermark
bits to the residual blocks generated by the encoder. The modified residual block,
after entropy encoding, is added to the bitstream. Gong and Lu [61] proposed
a watermarking scheme that modified the DC coefficients of the luminance com-
ponents within the residual blocks. They also applied a texture-based perceptual
model in order to improve the perceptual quality of the resulting video while at the
same time maintaining robustness. They claim that their algorithm can adapt-
ively choose the watermark strength based on the characteristics of each residual
block.
Most of the DCT based video watermarking techniques are limited to manip-
ulating only the AC coefficients or the residuals. At the most, some of the low
frequency AC coefficients/residuals are modified to contain a watermark bit. This
work instead aims to use the DC coefficients of 4×4 residual blocks to contain the
watermark.
4.3 Proposed Robust Watermarking
Methodology
The proposed scheme embeds the watermark in the 4×4 DC residuals generated by
the H.264 encoder. The DC values are read out from every residual macroblock as
shown in Fig.4.1. The watermark is assumed to be a random sequence of binary
values. The choice of DC residuals and the embedding within them is made
as follows: An index pair [i, j ] is randomly generated for every set of 4×4 DC
residuals, where 1≤i, j≤4. DCi,j is then the chosen residual. The watermark bit
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modified residual block, after entropy encoding, is added to the bitstream. Gong and Lu [54] proposed a 
watermarking scheme that modified the DC coefficients of the luminance components within the residual 
blocks. They also applied a texture-based perceptual model in order to improve the perceptual quality of 
the resulting video while at the same time maintaining robustness. They claim that their algorithm can 
adaptively choose the watermark strength based on the characteristics of each residual block.  
Most of the DCT based video watermarking techniques are limited to manipulating only the AC 
coefficients or the residuals. At the most, some of the low frequency AC coefficients/residuals are 
modified to contain a watermark bit. This work instead aims to use the DC coefficients of 4×4 residual 
blocks to contain the watermark. 
 
4.3 Watermarking DC coefficients 
The proposed scheme embeds the watermark in the 4×4 DC residuals generated by the H.264 encoder. 
The DC values are read out from every residual macroblock as shown in Fig. 4.1. The watermark is 
assumed to be a random sequence of binary values. The choice of DC residuals and the embedding within 
them is made as follows: An index pair [i, j] is randomly generated for every set of 4×4 DC residuals, 
where 1 ! i, j! 4. DCi, j is then the chosen residual. The watermark bit simply overwrites the Least 
Significant Bit (LSB) of DCi, j. The set of randomly generated [i, j] is the key.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
As is obvious, on an average, half of DCi, j values will remain unchanged since the LSB being overwritten 
might be the same as the watermark bit being embedded. But even those DC values that have changed, 
the change is not significant. Only for those rare conditions where the chosen DCi,,j is very small, will 
some change be noticeable. Further, the embedding of the watermark is not just limited to I-frames, as is 
normally done by earlier video watermarking algorithms, but involves the P and the B-frames as well. 
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Fig.4.1:  Extraction of residual DC coefficients from a 4×4 luminance macroblock      Figure 4.1: Extrac ion f residual oefficients from a 4×4 luminance
macroblock
simply overwrites the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of DCi,j. The set of randomly
generated [i, j ] is the key.
As is obvious, on an average, half of DCi,j values will remain unchanged since
the LSB being overwritten might be the same as the watermark bit being embed-
ded. But even those DC values that have changed, the change is not significant.
Only for those rare conditions where the chosen DCi,j is very small, will some
change be noticeable. Further, the embedding of the watermark is not just lim-
ited to I-frames, as is normally done by earlier video watermarking algorithms,
but involves the P and the B-frames as well. This leads to a higher payload capa-
city. Figure 4.2 indicates the stage within the H.264 encoder where the proposed
algorithm intervenes to embed the watermark.
In Fig.4.2, Dn is the residual value of a 4×4 macroblock to be encoded. Before
it is sent for transformation and quantization, the watermark embedding algorithm
intervenes and embeds the payload within Dn. These modified residual blocks are
then again handed over to the encoder wherein they are transformed, quantized
and entropy encoded and transmitted. At the decoder side, these modified residual
macroblocks are identified using the key (which could be sent across as supple-
mentary information or via a secure channel) and the LSBs of the matched DCi,j
are read out. The LSBs are reconstituted to build the extracted watermark. The
extracted watermark can be compared to the original to find out the number of
correctly extracted watermark bits. Figure 4.2 also illustrates that the proposed
algorithm is spatial domain technique.
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Figure 4.2: Watermark embedding within DC coefficients
4.4 Simulation Results and Performance
Analysis
The proposed watermarking algorithm was implemented in the H.264 reference
software version JM15.0 [62]. The watermark to be embedded was assumed to
be a two-tone image consisting of a pseudorandom sequence of 1s and 0s {w(i),
i=1, 2, ......., n}, where n is the watermark length and each w(i) is either 0 or
1. Standard QCIF, 176×144 video sequences were used as the host. The frame
rate was set at 30 frames per second. The software was run on a number of
sample videos such as Foreman, Coastguard, Miss America and Suzie. Each of
these samples was chosen as the host for watermark embedding, once with the
rate control OFF and then with the rate control ON. The performance of the
watermarking algorithm was checked, first with the number of frames equal to 3
and then increased to 16 to include at least one GOP.The results are presented in
Tables 4.1a, 4.1b, 4.2a and 4.2b respectively.
With a 176×144 video, and 16×16 prediction, there is a total of 11×9=99
macroblocks per frame. Since 4×4 luminance coefficients are used to obtain the DC
residuals, this will lead to a total of 16×99=1584 DC residuals per frame. Since one
DC residual is chosen out of every 4×4=16 residual values to contain a watermark,
each of the (1×99) DC residual values contain one watermark bit per frame. These
calculations imply that a 3-frame video sequence would contain 1584×3=4752
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Table 4.1a: PSNR and bitrate values for 3 frames with rate control OFF
Without watermark With watermark
Video
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
Foreman 37.08 34624 346.24 36.93 34624 346.24
Miss America 41.13 12968 129.68 40.91 12968 129.68
Coastguard 35.68 37224 372.24 35.11 37224 372.24
Suzie 37.91 19864 198.64 37.41 19864 198.64
Table 4.1b: PSNR and bitrate values for 3 frames with rate control ON
Without watermark With watermark
Video
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
Foreman 32.38 164.00 164.00 32.06 16400 164.00
Miss America 37.04 6576 65.76 36.79 6576 65.76
Coastguard 30.87 13184 131.84 30.25 13184 131.84
Suzie 33.97 8888 88.88 33.41 8888 88.88
Table 4.2a: PSNR and bitrate values for 16 frames with rate control OFF
Without watermark With watermark
Video
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
Foreman 36.82 84976 159.33 36.54 84976 159.33
Miss America 40.80 22368 41.94 39.56 22368 41.94
Coastguard 34.87 111480 209.30 34.29 111480 209.03
Suzie 37.50 35392 66.36 36.90 35392 66.36
Table 4.2b: PSNR and bitrate values for 16 frames with rate control ON
Without watermark With watermark
Video
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total
bits
Bitrate
(kbps)
Foreman 30.91 27560 51.67 30.22 27560 51.67
Miss America 39.43 25560 47.92 38.98 25560 47.92
Coastguard 34.87 111480 209.03 34.36 111480 209.03
Suzie 35.20 25760 48.30 34.63 25760 48.30
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DC residual values.Out of these, only 99×3=297 DC residual values contain the
watermark information i.e. only 6.25% of the DC residuals are modified to contain
the watermark. Even though these payload values seem to be low, in a typical
video sequence however, there would be thousands of frames and in such a case,
the amount of payload that can be embedded will be very high.
The results in the above tables indicate that there is a very small change in the
PSNR values, both with the rate control turned OFF and ON. The video sequences
have been chosen in such a way that two of them are high motion sequences i.e.
Foreman and Coastguard while the other two are low motion sequences. For the
high motion sequences, the prediction will be less accurate and hence the residual
values will be relatively high. This means that embedding a watermark into these
residuals will lead to lesser degree of change in their values. Correspondingly, the
PSNR values after embedding the watermark remain much closer to the unwater-
marked values. This fact can be verified from the above tables. In contrast, the
DC residuals will be quite small for low motion video sequences since the predic-
tion will be more accurate and hence watermark embedding can lead to a greater
degree of change. This results in PSNR values that are farther away from the
PSNR values of the unwatermarked video sequence. This fact can also be verified
from the above tables by examining the difference in the PSNR values of Miss
America and Suzie. Thus, the proposed technique offers better performance for
high motion video as compared to low motion ones.
When the rate control is turned ON, the quantization parameters change dy-
namically to adjust to the required bitrate. This means that the DC residual
values may get changed as well to meet the bitrate requirements. However, even
this constraint leads to imperceptible changes in the quality of the watermarked
video. This proves that the proposed watermarking technique is highly transpar-
ent.
Finally, this algorithm is more robust than the algorithm proposed by Noork-
ami and Mersereau [58]. In their work, they utilized only the quantized AC re-
siduals of the luminance component of 4×4 intra-predicted blocks to contain the
watermark. When a very low bitrate is required, the quantization parameter will
be set to be a very high value. This may lead to even some of the mid- and low-
frequency AC residuals being dropped off and which may, in turn, lead to a loss of
some watermark bits. The technique proposed in this paper is resistant to such a
scenario since the DC coefficients are rarely modified as a result of re-compression.
This is verified from Table 4.3 which shows that the proposed technique not only
offers a higher payload per I-frame but is also more robust to re-encoding than the
method proposed in [58]. This table also proves that the proposed technique has
no effect on the bitrate of the encoded video in contrast to the method proposed
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Table 4.3: Performance characteristics of the proposed technique
Watermark Re-compression Bitrate
bits recovery rate (%) increase(%)
Video
Proposed
method
Method
in [58]
Proposed
method
Method
in [58]
Proposed
method
Method
in [58]
Carphone 99 44 73 58 0 0.80
Claire 99 22 88 83 0 0.44
Mobile 99 85 91 85 0 0.23
Mother 99 42 66 68 0 0.69
Table 99 38 71 62 0 0.31
Tempete 99 81 89 83 0 0.44
in [58].
To extract the watermark, the key was made available at the decoder. It
was found that irrespective of the rate control being ON or OFF, almost the
entire watermark could be successfully extracted. This verifies the theory that
DC coefficients are largely unaffected by the changes in quantization parameters
which in turn ensures the robustness of the watermark. Some of the extracted
watermarks are depicted in Fig.4.3. Figure 4.3b shows the extracted watermark
when the rate control (RC) is OFF and the quantization parameter is changed
from 28 to 32. Figure 4.3c shows the extracted watermark with the RC turned
ON. It can be seen that there is slightly more degradation in the quality of the
extracted watermark with the RC turned ON than with OFF. This is due to the
fact that with the RC turned ON, the encoder dynamically changes the value of
the quantisation parameters to satisfy the upper limit imposed by the available
bandwidth.
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values will be quite high. This means that embedding a watermark into these residuals will lead to lesser 
degree of change in their values. Correspondingly, the PSNR values after embedding the watermark 
remain much closer to the unwatermarked values. This fact can be verified from the above tables. In 
contrast, the DC residuals will be quite small for low motion video sequences since the prediction will be 
more accurate and hence watermark embedding can lead to a greater degree of change. This results in 
PSNR values that are farther away from the PSNR values of the unwatermarked video sequence. This fact 
can also be verified from the above tables by looking at the difference in the PSNR values of Miss 
America and Suzie. Thus, the proposed technique offers better performance for high motion video as 
compared to low motion ones. 
When the rate control is turned ON, the quantizatio  parameters change dynamically to adjust to 
the required bitrate. This means that the DC residual values may get changed as well to meet the bitrate 
requirements. But even this constraint leads to imperceptible changes in the quality of the watermarked 
video. A subjective evaluation of the watermarked sequences was carried out and it was verified that there 
was an imperceptible change in the quality of the watermarked video sequences. This proves that the 
proposed watermarking technique is highly transparent.  
Finally, this algorithm is more robust than the algorithm proposed by Noorkami and Mersereau 
[49]. In their work, they utilized only the quantized AC residuals of the luminance component of 4×4 
intra-predicted blocks to contain the watermark. When a very low bitrate is required, the quantization 
parameter will be se  to be a very high value. This may lead to even some of the mid and low frequency 
AC re iduals being dropped off and which m y, in turn, ead to a loss of watermark bits. The technique 
proposed in this paper is resistant to such a scenario since the DC coefficients are normally not disturbed 
during compression.  
To extract the watermark, the key was made available at the decoder. It was found that 
irrespective of the rate control being ON or OFF, almost the entire watermark could be successfully 
extracted. This verifies the theory that DC coefficients are largely unaffected by the changes in 
quantization parameters which in turn ensures the robustness of the watermark. Some of the extracted 
watermarks are shown in Fig. 4.3. Figure 4(b) shows the extracted watermark when the rate control (RC) 
is OFF and the quantization parameter is changed from 28 to 32. Figure 4(c) shows the extracted 
watermark with the RC turned ON. It can be seen that there is slightly more degradation in the quality of 
the extracted watermark with the RC turned ON than with OFF.  
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values will be quite high. This means that embedding a watermark into these r iduals wi l lead to lesser 
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contrast, the DC residuals wi l be quite small for ow motion v deo sequences since the prediction will be 
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America and Suzie. Thus, the proposed technique off rs b tter performance for high motion video as 
compared to low motion ones. 
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the requi d bitrate. This means that the DC residual values may get changed as well to meet the bitrate 
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[49]. In their wo k, they utilized only the quantized AC residuals of the luminance component of 4×4
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AC residuals bei g dropped off and which may, in tur , lead to a l ss of watermark bits. The tec nique 
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during compression.  
To extract the watermark, the key was made vail ble at the deco r. It was found that
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is OFF and the quantiz tion parameter is changed from 28 to 32. Figure 4(c) show  the extracted 
watermark with the RC turned ON. It can be seen that there is slightly more degradation in the quality of 
the extracted watermark with the RC turned ON than with OFF.  
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values wi l be quite high. T s means that embedding a watermark into these r siduals will lead to sser 
degree of change in th ir values. Correspondingly, the PSNR values after emb dding the watermark 
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contrast, the DC residuals will be quite small for low moti n vide  sequ nces since the pr diction will be
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the r quired bitrate. This means that the DC residual values may get changed as w ll to meet the bi rat  
requirements. But ev n this constraint leads o imperceptible changes in th  quality of the watermarked 
video. A subjective evaluation of the watermarked sequ nc s was carried out and it was verified that there 
was an imperceptible change in the quality of the watermarked video sequences. This prove that the 
prop sed watermarking tech ique is highly transparent.  
Finally, this algor thm is more robust than the lgorithm p op sed by Noorkami and Mersereau 
[49]. In their work, they utilized only the quantized AC residuals of the lumina ce compone t of 4×  
intra-predicted blocks to ontain the watermark. When a very low bitrate is equired, the quantizatio  
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AC residuals being dropped off and which may, in turn, lead to a loss of watermark bits. The t chnique 
prop sed in this pa er is resistant to such a s enario si c  the DC coefficients are ormally n t disturbed 
during compression.  
To extract the wa ermark, the ey was made av il ble at th decoder. It was found that 
irrespective of th rate control being ON or FF, almost the ntire wa e mark could be successf lly 
extracted. This verifies the theory t at DC coefficients ar  largely unaffected by the changes in 
quantizatio  p rameters which in turn ens es the robustness of the watermark. Some of the extracted 
watermarks are shown i  Fig. 4.3. Figure 4(b) shows the extracted w termark when the rate control (RC) 
is OFF and the quantizatio  p rameter is changed from 28 to 32. Figure 4(c) shows t e xtracted 
watermark with t e RC turned ON. It can be s en that there is slightly more degrad tion i  he quality of 
the extracted w termark with t e RC urned ON than wi  OFF.  
 
                         
 
$%&# $'&# $(&#(c) Watermark extracted with
RC=ON
Figure 4.3: Extracted watermark
4.5 Conclusion
Robust watermarking systems play an important role when the aim is to prove
ownership of any digital media. This is due to the fact that they are able to
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resist any modifications that might be made to their carrier. This chapter presen-
ted a robust watermarking system that made use of the DC coefficients within
4×4 residual macroblocks generated by the H.264 encoder. The proposed tech-
nique was tested on a wide variety of both, high motion and low motion video
sequences. Simulation results show that the embedded watermark is capable of
surviving varying bitrate constraints and hence compression. Further, there is an
imperceptible change in the quality of the host data and no increase in the res-
ulting bitrate since the algorithm only replaces the LSB of a DC coefficient. This
means that the technique is also particularly suited for low bitrate applications.
The drawback of the proposed watermarking system is that it is ineffective against
those signal processing applications that change the prediction mode since that
would in turn lead to a change in the residual values and loss of the watermark.
The results of this work appear in [63].
Chapter 5
Irreversible Fragile Watermarking
The advantage of digital content is that it can be easily copied, modified or edited.
However, in many instances this could turn into a drawback whereby unauthor-
ized users can illegally modify, copy and distribute the content. In such cases, it
might be necessary to authenticate the content in order to detect whether it has
been tampered with. One of the methodologies developed to authenticate digital
content is fragile watermarking. The method proposed in this chapter is an ir-
reversible watermarking technique while the method presented in Chapter 6 is a
reversible watermarking approach. Both techniques were implemented within the
JM Reference Software and experiments were conducted to test their performance.
5.1 Introduction
A fragile watermarking system has characteristics which are similar to any other
watermarking system. However, the side information which is used to detect and
extract the watermark plays a much more important role in a fragile watermarking
system. The side information can be the “key” used to identify the embedding
locations within the video, the watermark itself, or any other auxiliary inform-
ation.The watermark detection system uses a statistical testing model to detect
whether the image has been tampered with. If the detection model detects tam-
pering then it is also desirable for it to detect the location of the tampering.
There are a few other features that are desirable within a fragile watermarking
system.They are briefly outlined in the following paragraph.
One of the most desirable, in fact, essential feature is perceptual transpar-
ency.This feature implies that the watermarked host data should remain percep-
tually similar to its original (un-watermarked) counterpart. Next, the watermark
detection system should be unambiguous i.e. only the relevant key should be able
to detect the watermark. Any other side information should fail to detect the
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existence of a watermark. The detection of the watermark should be blind i.e.
the detection system should not need the original host data to successfully detect
the watermark. The security of the key should be independent of the detection
mechanism i.e. knowledge of the detection methodology should not reveal the key.
A good fragile watermarking system should keep the key private while making the
detection mechanism public. If both are linked then unauthorized users can use
the detection mechanism to reveal the key, use it to remove the original watermark
and embed their own. A more detailed discussion on the properties of a desirable
fragile watermarking system can be found in [41,64,65]. However, the significance
of one feature over the other depends on the application domain of the fragile
watermark.
There are some attacks that are specifically targeted towards fragile water-
marking systems. It is imperative to have an understanding of these in order to
design improved systems. Most of these attacks, though fairly common, are usu-
ally quite potent in rendering the watermarking system ineffective. They include
attacks that a fragile watermarking system may fail to detect. For instance, a new
watermark may be carefully embedded so that it doesnt perturb the earlier water-
mark. The detector then falsely accepts the new mark as authentic. In some cases,
an attacker may use brute force to try to completely remove the watermark. The
owner of the content then has nothing to authenticate. Some attacks are launched
on the authentication model itself rather than on the content in order to force it
to accept a possibly tampered set of data as genuine. Further details of attacks
on authentication systems can be found in [66].
The above discussion regarding the features of a fragile watermarking system
and the attacks on them are equally valid for both, irreversible and reversible
systems and hence also applicable to the method proposed in Chapter 6
5.2 Irreversible Fragile Watermarks
Fragile watermarking techniques have largely been ignored by the research com-
munity but it doesnt make their significance any lesser [67]. There exists a large
class of applications that can benefit immensely by making use of fragile water-
marking systems. Fragile watermarks can play a very important role in detecting
unauthorized tampering and modifications within video as well. However, there
exist only a few fragile watermarking systems that have been designed specially to
cater to video. A quick look at the state-of-the-art shows relatively fewer fragile
watermarking algorithms designed for the H.264 standard. There are two reasons,
the first one being that the standard generates a highly compressed video stream.
This leaves a very limited set of redundancies that can be exploited to embed a
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watermark. The second reason is that for H.264 video, content and copyright pro-
tection are considered to be of higher significance than authentication. Since the
first reason is a hurdle which must be crossed even by content protection (robust
watermarking) systems, it is actually the second reason which contributes towards
a comparatively smaller body of literature that exists dealing with authenticating
H.264 based content.
Some of the most popular fragile watermarking techniques for H.264 are high-
lighted as follows. Chen et al. [68] proposed a semi-fragile H.264 based video au-
thentication method in which they used the block sub-band index and coefficient
modulation of the quantized AC coefficients of the I-frame to embed the water-
mark. They claim that the video quality goes down only marginally and that they
are able to locate the tampered location in the watermarked video frames. Kuo
et al. [69] suggested a method wherein they exploited the fragility of the motion
vectors to embed the watermark. They claimed that their technique maintained
the perceptual quality of the host video. Wang and Hsu [70] proposed embedding
a blind watermark in the residual macroblocks for H.264 video stream authentic-
ation. They used the last non-zero quantized coefficient of the residual block to
contain the watermark information. The technique proposed in [69] promises the
best rate-distortion characteristics among three other motion-vector based water-
marking techniques. The algorithm proposed in [70] showed that the watermark
can detect any tampering done due to recompression or GOP removal. After these
two attacks the watermark extractor simply returned random noise.
Pro¨frock et al. [71] presented a fragile, blind and erasable watermark that
used some of the skipped macroblocks within the H.264 video. After selecting
a set of skipped macroblocks, two popular watermarking techniques i.e. Least
Significant Bit (LSB) and Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) were used to
embed the watermark. The number of skipped macroblocks, their distribution
and the number of watermark bits per block is decided by a special process. This
technique works by performing partial entropy decoding to obtain the video data
out of the bitstream, choosing the skipped macroblocks, embedding the watermark
along with the encrypted hash value and a public key into the skipped macroblocks.
These modified macroblocks are again re-inserted into the H.264 bitstream. Even
though such a technique ensures that the watermark is truly blind, it leads to
additional computational overhead since the partially decoded bitstream is to be
re-encoded before transmission.
Most of the above mentioned techniques operate in the transform domain by
modifying the coefficients before they are entropy encoded. There is clearly, a lack
of techniques that operate during or after the entropy encoding stage. Fragile wa-
termarking techniques perform best when they are implemented in the compressed
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domain. The reason being that the content is already highly compressed with al-
most no redundancy. Hence any kind of attack is enough to perturb the bitstream
and the embedded mark thereby indicating tampering. Compressed domain wa-
termarking techniques offer the advantage of being computationally efficient, not
needing the original content for detection and if done right, being perceptually
as well as analytically transparent. At the receiver side, the watermark can be
extracted before decompressing the video.
The technique proposed in the next section works by embedding the watermark
during the CAVLC entropy encoding stage thereby becoming a compressed domain
approach and hence satisfying the above mentioned requirements.
5.3 Proposed Algorithm
The important aspect to consider within CAVLC entropy encoding is the number
of non-zero coefficients (TotalCoeffs) and the number of T1 s [see section 2.5].
This means that effectively there should no change in the value of coeff-token.
Any change in the value of coeff-token would change the choice of look-up table
for its neighbouring blocks and subsequently its VLC. This in turn, might affect
the quality and bitrate of the resulting encoded video. Thus, to satisfy the criteria
of transparency, any watermarking technique based on CAVLC should ensure that
the value of coeff-token and hence the choice of look-up table remains unchanged.
The technique proposed here works by only modifying the last non-zero coef-
ficient of the 4×4 block during the entropy encoding stage. The justification for
choosing 4× 4 blocks is that H.264/ AVC performs 4x4 transform in the complex
and textured areas with detailed information. The human eye is less sensitive
to any changes/modifications in such an area and hence embedding a watermark
would ensure better transparency. In contrast, the encoder performs 16×16 trans-
form in the smooth areas and those areas with less activity. Any changes in such
areas would be easily noticeable and hence is not a suitable choice for watermark
embedding.
Let the last non-zero coefficient be referred to as last coeff from this point
onwards. From section 2.5, it is clear that last coeff can either be a T1 or any
other non-zero value, say, c. Since the proposed technique only modifies last coeff,
the modification could be either on a T1 or on c. Further, since it is the highest
frequency component, any modification to it would lead to imperceptible changes.
At the same time, this coefficient is the most sensitive and any intentional or
unintentional modifications of the block would perturb the watermark information
thereby indicating tampering. The mechanism for embedding and extraction is
given in Algorithm 1 and the location within the encoder where the technique has
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been incorporated is depicted in Fig.5.1
input : n,the number of 4×4 blocks within an I-frame;
blocki, the i
th 4× 4 block within an I-frame;
{w(k),k=1,2.....m} the watermark sequence, where m is the
watermark length, each w(k) is either 0 or 1 and m<<n;
S, the set of m random numbers between 0 and n;
output: Random 4×4 macroblocks containing watermark bits
1 Watermark embedding:
2 for each element i within S do
3 if blocki = empty then // all residuals==0
4 skip (blocki);
5 else readlastcoeff (blocki);
6 if lastcoeff == T1 then
7 if wk== 0 then set T1 = c else set T1 = −1;
8 if lastcoeff == c then
9 if wk== 0 and c%2 = 0 then set c = c;
10 else if wk== 0 and c%2 = ±1 then
11 set c = c+ 1;
12 if wk== 1 and c%2 = 0 then
13 set c = c+ 1;
14 else if wk== 1 and c%2 = ±1 then
15 set c = c;
16 Watermark extraction:
17 for each element i within S do
18 if blocki = empty then // all residuals==0
19 skip (blocki);
20 else readlastcoeff (blocki);
21 if lastcoeff == T1==1 then
22 wk ==0;
23 else wk==1;
24 else if lastcoeff == c then
25 if c%2 = 0 then
26 wk == 0;
27 else if c%2 = ±1 then
28 wk == 1;
Algorithm 1: Watermark embedding and extraction methodology
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              Watermark Extraction: 
                        For every value i within S do: 
                         a) If blocki is empty, skip blocki; 
         else access lastcoeff within blocki; 
                            b) If lastcoeff = T1: 
                                                 0,         if T1 = 1; 
                                   wk = 
                                      1,         if T1= -1; 
 
                      Else If lastcoeff = c (non-T1, non-zero): 
 
                                              0,        if c mod 2 = 0; 
                              wk =        
             1,        if c mod 2 = ±1;  
 
 
As can be seen from the above algorithm, theoretically, there is a 50% chance that last_coeff would 
remain unchanged. In addition, it can also be deduced that if there is no change in any of the VLCs then 
there would be no change in the bitrate. Even when c is modified, the technique ensures that the change is 
never more than 1 bit per c so the increase in the total bitrate is never too significant. This should ensure a 
high level of transparency. In addition, since the proposed algorithm involves simple mathematical 
operations, the watermark embedding and extraction module is not expected to add any significant 
computational overhead to the H.264 codec. 
The choice of using the I-frames only to embed the watermark offers two very obvious but useful 
advantages. First, the significance of I-frames in a video sequence discourages a potential attacker from 
modifying since it will affect all subsequent frames predicted from it leading to errors such as drift 
thereby degrading overall video quality. Secondly, watermarking the I-frames offers the luxury of 
−!
$%&&'()#
*+,#
+! -(#
!!!−!
#.'/0(1)&%/)'2#
-′(#+!
3# 4# .'0&2'&# $+5,$#
67#
8(−9# 6$#
:()&;<&'2=/)=0(#
>&'?=0%1#
4−9#3#−9#8=@)'&#8′(#
8(#
!"#$%&'())*
!A!#B%;()=C'2#/0'DD=/='()1#
!
E;)'&F;&G#H##############I###JJJ999I9IIJJJJ#
Fig. 5.1:  Proposed watermarking technique Figure 5.1: Domain of the proposed fragile watermarking approach
As can be seen from the above algorithm, theoretically, there is a 50% chance
that last coeff would remain unchanged. In addition, it can also be deduced that
if there is no change in any of the VLCs then there would be no change in the
bitrate. Even when c is modified, the technique ensures that the change is never
more than 1 bit per c, thus the increase in the total bitrate is never too significant.
This should ensure a high level of transparency. In addition, since the proposed
algorithm involves simple mathematical operations, the watermark embedding and
extraction module is not expected to add any significant computational overhead
to the H.264 cod c.
The choice of using the I-fram s o ly to mbe the watermark offers tw very
obvious but useful advantages. First, the significance of I-frames in a video s -
quence discourages a potential attacker from modifying since it will affect all sub-
sequent frames predicted from it leading to errors such as drift thereby degrading
overall video quality. Secondly, watermarking the I-frames offers the luxury of
embedding a higher payload since very few 4×4 blocks are empty. The proposed
technique ensures that all non-empty 4×4 blocks contain one bit of watermark
information within c. In a 176×144 I-frame and assuming only 4×4 integer trans-
form, there would be 1584 blocks per frame. The set of random values within
S would specify the order in which the watermark bits will be embedded within
these blocks. Theoretically, if every block were to contain a watermark bit then
there would be 1584 watermark bits per frame which can be considered to be a
significant payload.
The security of the algorithm can be increased by randomly choosing a subset
of non-empty 4×4 blocks to embed the watermark bits rather than every 4×4
block. But this will be at the expense of a lower watermark payload. Hence a
trade-off is to be made between the security of the algorithm and the payload size.
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5.4 Simulation Results and Performance
Analysis
The proposed watermarking algorithm was implemented in the H.264 reference
software version JM15.1 [62]. For the sake of simplicity, the watermark to be
embedded was assumed to be a two-tone image of size 26×26 pixels at 1 bit per
pixel [see Fig.5.3a]. Standard QCIF, 176×144 video sequences were used as the
host to embed the watermark. The frame rate was set at 30 frames per second,
the GOP length was fixed at 16 and the rate-distortion optimization was switched
off. The H.264 software was run on a number of sample videos such as Foreman,
Coastguard, Hall and Container. The performance of the proposed technique
was evaluated under different encoding conditions such as using a wide range
of quantization parameters. The computational complexity of the watermarking
technique was evaluated along with the PSNR value comparison. The results at
QP=30 are shown in Table 5.1. As can be seen, there is a negligible change in all
the four parameters. Thus the technique satisfies the criteria of transparency. In
fact, it can be observed that the increase in the number of bits is, at the most 16,
particularly in the case of Foreman,Container and Carphone.
Another point of interest is the total encoding time. The increase in the total
encoding time is barely 2 seconds more than the total encoding time of the en-
coder running without the embedding module. This proves that the proposed
watermarking algorithm is computationally quite efficient since it uses simple op-
erations like mod and addition for watermark embedding. The bitrate value also
stays almost the same even after watermark embedding for all video samples.
The watermark is extracted during the CAVLC entropy decoding stage. The
detector at the decoder side reads last coeff as per the extraction technique ex-
plained in Algorithm 1 and extracts the watermark. It can be seen that the water-
mark is extracted before the frame is fully decoded and the original frame is also
not required thus making this technique a blind one. The extracted watermark is
compared with the original to check tampering. This is done by calculating the
Normalized Coefficient (NC) as:
ρ =
n∑
i=0
[(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)]
n∑
i=0
(xi − x¯)2
n∑
i=0
(yi − y¯)2
where xi and yi are the pixel values of the original and the extracted watermark
respectively and x¯ and y¯ are their mean values. It can be seen that ρ = 1 for a
exact match between the embedded and the extracted watermark and 0 for a total
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mismatch.
Table 5.1: Performance characteristics at QP = 30
Without watermark
Video
sequence
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total bits
(bits)
Total
encoding time
(secs)
Bitrate
(kbps)
Foreman 35.75 643872 1082.66 120.73
Coastguard 34.84 1143992 1131.90 214.50
Hall 37.19 249432 1033.93 46.77
Container 35.98 175880 1058.14 32.98
Carphone 37.70 407360 1056.72 76.38
With watermark
Video
sequence
PSNR(Y)
(dB)
Total bits
bits
Total
encoding time
(secs)
Bitrate
(kbps)
Foreman 35.03 643888 1083.06 121.84
Coastguard 34.17 1144000 1133.36 215.76
Hall 36.28 249438 1034.05 48.08
Container 35.24 175896 1058.71 34.41
Carphone 37.08 407376 1057.51 77.52
The fragility of the watermark was tested under a variety of attacks such as
transcoding, rotation, median filtering and cropping. The attacker would ideally
want to attack the watermarked video in such a way such that the watermark
is completely destroyed but at the same time there is no perceivable degradation
in the quality of the video. The parameters of the attacks were chosen to create
such a scenario. The performance of the fragile watermark under these attacks is
shown in Table 5.2. The watermark detector at the decoder side was setup with
the following parameters:
If(ρL = 0.5)< Φ <(ρH = 1), then Φ := η
else if Φ <(ρL < 0.5), then Φ := ζ
where;
ρL: lower bound threshold of NC
ρH : higher bound threshold of NC
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Φ: the detector response
η: the channel noise
ζ: tampering attack
Table 5.2: Watermark fragility evaluation under some common attacks
Detector response Φ, NC ρ
Video
sequence
Transcoding
QP from 30 to 32
Rotation
0.25o
Median
3× 3 filtering
Cropped
164× 132
Foreman 0.53,0.53 0.55,0.53 0.45,0.45 0.47,0.47
Coastguard 0.45,0.43 0.46,0.40 0.47,0.46 0.49,0.47
Hall 0.36,0.30 0.46,0.42 0.47,0.45 0.61,0.58
Container 0.60,0.57 0.47,0.46 0.50,0.50 0.52,0.48
Carphone 0.41,0.41 0.43,0.46, 0.50,0.52 0.48,0.45
!"#
#
Table 2 shows that the  Ð < 0.5 for most of the attacks thereby verifying that the watermark is fragile and 
easily detects tampering. Setting a threshold level of Ð = 0.5 is quite lenient considering that the 
watermark will be totally unrecognizable if more than half of its information is lost. Practically speaking, 
Ð  should be set at 0.75, below which the alarm of tampering could be raised. The justification for making 
such a statement is that only a well planned attack can distort the watermark beyond 25% and it is very 
rare that the channel noise would distort the mark beyond this threshold.  
Snapshots of the first I-frame of an attacked video with respect to a watermarked frame that has 
not been attacked are shown in Fig.5.2. A subjective evaluation was carried out and the subjects were 
unable to see any perceivable difference between the un-watermarked and the watermarked video 
samples. 
 
 
Video Sequence 
Detector response Ð, NC ! 
Transcoding 
QP=32 
Rotation 
0.25o 
Median 
3x3 
Filtering 
Cropping 
164x132 
(6x6 border 
cropping) 
Foreman 0.53, 0.531 0.55, 0.536 0.45, 0.455 0.47, 0.471 
Coast-guard 0.45, 0.433 0.46, 0.402 0.47,  0.464 0.49, 0.474 
Container 0.36, 0.301 0.46, 0.421 0.47, 0.453 0.61, 0.582 
Hall 0.60, 0.575 0.47, 0.464 0.50, 0.500 0.52, 0.481 
Car-phone 0.41, 0.415 0.43, 0.468 0.50, 0.529 0.48, 0.458 
 
The watermark extracted from an un-attacked video sample is depicted in Fig. 5.3(a) while Fig.5.3(b) and 
(c) show the watermark extracted after the transcoding and median filtering attack respectively. As can be 
seen, the watermark is destroyed under both the attacks. Similar observations were made for the rotation 
and cropping operations.  
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Table 5.2:  Watermark fragility evaluation under some common 
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Table 2 shows that the  Ð < 0.5 for most of the attacks ther by verifying that the watermark is fragile and 
easily det cts tampering. Setting a threshold level of Ð = 0.5 is quite lenient considering that the 
watermark will be totally unrecognizable if more than half of its information is lost. Practically speaking, 
Ð  should be set at 0.75, below which the al rm of tampering could be raised. The justification for making 
such a statement is that only a well planned attack can distort the watermark beyond 25% and it is very 
rare that the channel noise would istort the mark beyond this threshold.  
Snapshots of the first I-frame of an attacked video with respect to a watermarked frame that has 
not been attacked are shown in Fig.5.2. A subjective valuation was carried out and the subjects wer  
unable to see any perceivable differ nce between the un-watermarked and the watermarked video 
samples. 
 
 
Video Sequence 
Det ctor esponse Ð, NC ! 
Transcoding 
QP=32 
Rotation 
0.25o 
Median 
3x3 
Filtering 
Cropping 
164x132 
(6x6 border 
cro ing) 
Foreman 0.53, 0.531 0.55, 0.536 0.45, 0.455 0.47, 0.471 
Coast-guard 0.45, 0.433 0.46, 0.402 0.47,  0.464 0.49, 0.474 
Container 0.36, 0.301 0.46, 0.421 0.47, 0.453 0.61, 0.582 
Hall 0.60, 0.575 0.47, 0.464 0.50, 0.500 0.52, 0.481 
Car-phone 0.41, 0.415 0.43, 0.468 0.50, 0.529 0.48, 0.458 
 
The watermark extracted from an un-attacked video sample is depicted in Fig. 5.3(a) while Fig.5.3(b) and 
(c) show the watermark extracted after the transcoding and median filtering attack respectively. As can be 
seen, the watermark is destroyed under both the attacks. Similar observations wer  made for the rotation 
and cropping operations.  
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Table 2 shows that the  Ð < 0.5 for most f the att cks ther by verifying that the watermark is fragile and 
easily detects tampering. Setting a thres old lev l of Ð = 0.5 is quite lenient considering that the 
watermark will be totally unrecognizable if more than lf of its information is lost. Practi ally speaking, 
Ð  should be set a 0.75, below hich t e alarm of tampering could be raised. The justification f r making 
such a statement is that only a well planned att ck can distort the watermark beyond 25% and it s very 
ra e that t e c annel oise would istort the mark beyond this t res old.  
Snapshots f the first I-frame of an att cked vi eo with respect to a w termarked frame that s 
not been att cked are shown in Fig.5.2. A subjective valuation was c rried out and the subjects wer  
unable to see any perceivable differ nce b tw en the un-watermarked and the watermarked video 
samples. 
 
 
Video S quence 
Detector response Ð, NC ! 
Transcoding 
QP=32 
Rotation 
0.25o 
Median 
3x  
Filtering 
Cropping 
164x132 
(6x  border 
cropping) 
Foreman 0.53, 0.531 0.55, 0. 36 0.45, 0.455 0.47, 0.471 
Coast-guard 0.45, 0.433 0.46, 0.402 0.47,  0.46  0.49, 0.47  
Container 0.36, 0.301 0.46, 0.421 0.47, 0.453 0.61, 0.582 
Hall 0.60, .57  0.47, 0.46  0.50, .50  0.52, 0.481 
Car-phone 0.41, 0.415 0.43, 0.468 0.50, .529 0.48, 0.458 
 
The watermark extracted from an un-att cked vi eo sample is depicted in Fig. 5.3(a) while Fig.5.3(b) and 
(c) show the watermark extracted after the transcoding a d median filtering att ck respectively. As can be 
seen, the watermark is destroyed under both the att cks. Similar observations wer  made for the rotation 
and cropping operations.  
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The rate-distortion (R-D) statistics and the R-D curve are depicted in Table 3 and Fig. 5.4 respectively. 
The R-D measurements were taken with a QP of 24, 28, 32, 36 and 40. Table 3 only shows the 
observations for QP at 28 and 36 so to compare with the results presented in [62]. In Table 3, Kuo et 
al.[62] and Qiu et al. [67] use H.264 encoded video as the host while Zhu et al. [65] and Zhang et al. [66] 
use MPEG2 as the host. It can be seen that the watermark payload for the proposed method is the highest 
Sequences Foreman Container 
QP 28 36 28 36 
Unwatermarked PSNR(dB) 36.89 31.30 36.22 30.72 
Bitrate(kbits/s) 84.11 28.97 32.44 8.81 
Proposed technique 
(WM=26x26, 1bpp) 
PSNR(dB) 36.03 30.92 35.93 30.48 
Bitrate(kbits/s) 84.37 29.05 32.61 8.95 
Kuo et al [22] 
(WM=no info available) 
PSNR(dB) 35.76 30.60 35.86 30.39 
Bitrate(kbits/s) 85.46 29.21 33.01 9.32 
Zhu et al [25] 
(WM=32x32, 1bpp) 
PSNR(dB) 35.74 30.53 35.86 30.30 
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Figure 5.2: Snapshots of an I-frame under some common attacks
Table 5.2 shows that Φ < 0.5 for most of the attacks thereby verifying that the
watermark is fragile and easily detects tampering. Setting a threshold level of Φ =
0.5 is quite lenient considering that the watermark will be totally unrecognizable
if more than half of its information is lost. Practically speaking, the threshold
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for Φ should be set at 0.75, below which the alarm of tampering could be raised.
The justification for making such a statement is that only a well planned attack
can distort the watermark beyond 25% and it is very rare that the channel noise
would distort the mark beyond this threshold. Snapshots of the first I-frame of an
attacked video with respect to a watermarked frame that has not been attacked
are shown in Fig.5.2.
The watermark extracted from an un-attacked video sample is depicted in
Fig.5.3a while Fig.5.3b and 5.3c show the watermark extracted after the transcod-
ing and median filtering attack respectively. As can be seen, the watermark is des-
troyed under both the attacks. Similar observations were made for the rotation
and cropping operations.
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Figure 5.3: Extracted watermarks
The rate-distortion (R-D) statistics and the R-D curve are depicted in Table
5.3 and Fig.5.4 respectively. The R-D measurements were taken with a QP of 24,
28, 32, 36 and 40. Table 5.3 only shows the observations for QP at 28 and 36 so
as to compare with the results presented in [69]. In Table 5.3, Kuo et al. [69] and
Qiu et al. [72] use H.264 enco ed video as the host while Zhu et al. [73] and Zhang
et al. [74] use MPEG2 as he hos . It can be seen that the watermark payload for
the proposed method is the highest except for Zhu et al. [73]. However, the video
standard used in Zhu et al. [73] is MPEG2 which has much higher redundancy
than the H.264 standard. This means that it offers more “space” to embed a much
larger payload.
Figure 5.4 indicates that the proposed technique performs better than the
other techniques, offering better R- D characteristics especially at higher bitrate
values. Even though there is not much of a difference in the PSNR values among
the techniques but the method proposed in this paper provides comparable PSNR
values at a lower bitrate. This is so because the embedding technique only changes
th value of last coeff (= ) by a most one 1 bit and that too very r rely. A manual
inspection of the values of last coeff while embedding the watermark in Foreman
revealed that only 8 values of c were modified for n = 100.
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Table 5.3: Comparison of R-D characteristics
Sequence Foreman Container
QP
Method
Payload
(bits)
R-D 28 36 28 36
PSNR(dB) 36.89 31.30 36.22 30.72
Unwatermarked
Bitrate(kbps) 84.11 28.97 32.44 8.81
PSNR(dB) 36.03 30.92 35.93 30.48
Proposed 26×26,1bpp
Bitrate(kbps) 84.37 29.05 32.61 8.95
PSNR(dB) 35.76 30.60 35.86 30.39
Kuo et al. [69] not known
Bitrate(kbps) 85.46 29.21 33.01 9.32
PSNR(dB) 35.74 30.53 35.86 30.30
Zhu et al. [73] 32×32,1bpp
Bitrate(kbps) 88.90 29.84 36.88 9.65
PSNR(dB) 35.76 30.58 35.84 30.30
Zhang et al. [74] 64
Bitrate(kbps) 87.84 29.56 36.36 9.65
PSNR(dB) 35.75 30.57 35.86 30.73
Qiu et al. [72] 99
Bitrate(kbps) 86.93 29.49 35.15 9.70
 
Figure 5.4: Rate-distortion curves for Container
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Figure 5.5: Watermark fragility evaluation
5.5 Conslusion
A fragile watermarking algorithm based on the CAVLC entropy method of H.264
AVC is proposed in this Chapter. The last (highest frequency) coefficient of a
4×4 quantized block within an I-frame is used to embed the watermark. The
technique offers many advantages such as being blind and perceptually transparent
while at the same time exhibiting encouraging R-D characteristics. The embedded
watermark is fragile enough to detect most of the attacks. Figure 5.5 shows that
the watermark gets perturbed even under the most common attacks and almost
50% of the watermark bits get altered which is significant enough to indicate
tampering. Finally, the watermarking technique is computationally efficient and
does not add any significant overhead to the H.264/AVC encoder and decoder.
The technique however, might fail in instances where an attacker might at-
tempt to completely remove the watermark by dropping off most of the high
frequency components from every 4×4 block. This could be achieved by setting a
high quantization parameter. In such a scenario, the detector would fail to detect
the presence of a watermark and hence tampering. However, the price the attacker
would have to pay would be in terms of a resulting video having poor quality. The
results of this methodology were published in [75].
Chapter 6
Reversible Fragile Watermarking
Watermarking digital content usually leads to irreversible changes in the host.
This can be unacceptable in certain application areas due to a number of reasons,
for instance, legal issues. To address these issues, the paradigm of reversible wa-
termarking was developed. This chapter proposes a reversible watermarking tech-
nique based on the Difference Expansion (DE) technique proposed by Tian [76].
The watermark so embedded is fragile in nature and is useful for authentication
systems. The proposed algorithm utilizes the IPCM macroblocks in an H.264/AVC
bitstream to embed a high-capacity watermark. The performance of the proposed
technique is evaluated for a variety of video samples and encoding parameters.
The results show that the technique is capable of embedding a high payload in the
H.264/AVC bitstream with a negligible effect on the rate-distortion characteristics
while at the same time being completely reversible.
6.1 Introduction
As pointed out in section 3.5, embedding a watermark inevitably leads to distor-
tions and introduction of unwanted artifacts. If the watermarking technique is
irreversible, then these distortions are permanent. In certain application domains
such as medical, surveillance and military, such irreversible distortions to the host
is totally unacceptable. This may be due to legal reasons or due to the high level
of sensitivity associated with the host data. In such application domains, irre-
versible watermarking techniques are clearly unsuitable. As a result, they require
a reversible watermarking approach wherein the host is restored to its original
undistorted form after the watermark has been detected/extracted.
A reversible watermarking system can also be effectively employed to authen-
ticate streaming videos or its source in application areas such as video confer-
encing, Video-on-Demand (VoD) etc. in order to prevent counterfeiting. The
55
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Figure 6.1: Watermarking in a multicast environment
advantage of reversible watermarking is that the quality of the video is not com-
promised since it is restored back to its original form before playback. In a VoD
scenario, as depicted in Fig.6.1, the video content to be streamed can be revers-
ibly watermarked at the server side with recipient specific information such as
the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number of a mobile device
or the identification number of the video codec chip on the recipient’s device. At
the receiver side, each recipient will receive a watermarked video stream with a
unique identification code as the watermark. Since the end-user has to be re-
gistered using a unique identification with the VoD server, the presence of that
unique identification as a watermark in the received video stream will authenticate
the source as legitimate. In addition, if the user receives a video stream with a
tampered/damaged watermark, then it would indicate forgery or a counterfeiting
attempt.
Reversible or lossless watermarking was first proposed by Hosinger et al. [77]
in a patent owned by The Eastman Kodak, followed by a number of algorithms
such as the Patchwork algorithm [78], its improvement proposed by Fridich et
al. [79] and the patchwork histogram rotation algorithm [80]. Consequently, many
other reversible algorithms were proposed for images. Celik et al. [81] proposed a
generalized LSB data embedding algorithm that utilized the quantization residues
to carry the payload. Lossless image compression algorithm was employed to
compress the residual values to achieve high embedding capacity. Kalker and
Willems [82] analyzed and proposed the theoretical limit of embedding a payload
in an image using lossless data compression.
Reversible watermarking techniques can be broadly classified into two categor-
ies: those that involve additive spread spectrum techniques and those that modify
the host signal. The first category [77, 83] involves superimposition of a spread
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spectrum signal corresponding to the watermark over the host signal. At the
decoder, the watermark signal is detected and then the watermark is subtracted
from the host signal to restore it back to its original form. The second category
of techniques [79,84–86] modify some portion of the host signal. This could be in
the spatial, transform or the compressed domain. However, since the modification
is mostly irreversible, information about those features that have been modified
are also compressed and made part of the payload. This information is then used
at the receiving end to restore the host signal back to its original form after ex-
traction of the watermark. The reversible watermarking technique proposed in
this paper belongs to the second category. Fig.6.2 depicts the general model of a
reversible watermarking system.
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Figure 6.2: Reversible watermarking
It is well known that watermarki g techniques designed for images can be mod-
ified to be pplied to digital vi eo as well. Fallahpour and Meg´ıas [87] propose
an error resilient reversible data hiding method for H.264/AVC wher in the pr -
diction error values are modified and then used to embed data. They claimed to
embed a large amount of payload while at the same time maintaining a high PSNR
value. Kapotas and Skodras [88] proposed a real-time data hiding method that
exploited the IPCM macroblocks to embed a watermark. The method used the
4 LSBs of every luminance and chrominance sample of an IPCM macroblock to
embed a watermark. However, both of these techniques are irreversible in nature.
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The proposed algorithm is also based on the idea of embedding watermarks
within IPCM macroblocks but in a reversible way by employing the DE method [76].
This method is applied on a pair of 8-bit pixel values within IPCM macroblocks.
In addition, the DE algorithm is also modified so that it is applied to only a single
macroblock within P frames in contrast to being applied to the whole frame (im-
age). The resulting algorithm is a reversible/lossless watermarking technique for
H.264/AVC video.
6.2 Background
This section provides a brief overview of the difference expansion technique when
applied to images and the IPCM macroblocks generated by the H.264/AVC en-
coder.
6.2.1 Difference Expansion
The DE method proposed by Tian [76] allows a high-capacity watermark payload
to be embedded in images and video, while at the same time being completely
reversible and maintaining a high visual quality. The technique works by selecting
a pair of neighbouring pixels and embedding the watermark in the difference of
their values. These difference values can be used to embed not only the message
(watermark payload), but also the restoration information, message authentication
code and any other secondary information.
Assume (x,y) are a pair of neighbouring pixel values, which could be adjacent
pixels or pixels within a defined area of an image/frame such as a macroblock.
Next, the difference h and average l are calculated between the pair. The difference
value h is utilized to embed a watermark bit b. This is done by multiplying h by 2
(shift left by 1 bit) and appending b at the LSB position resulting in a new value
h′. New (watermarked) pixel values (x′, y′) are then calculated using l and h′ and
sent across to the decoder. At the decoder side, (x′,y′) are used to extract the
watermark bit b and are restored back to their original values (x,y). Shown below
is an example of this technique.
Let x=206, y=212, b=1
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Watermark embedding:
l =
⌊
x+ y
2
⌋
=
⌊
206 + 212
2
⌋
= 209
h = x− y = 206− 212 = −6
h′ = 2× h+ b = 2× (−6) + 1 = −11
}
//Embedding
x′ = l +
⌊
h′ + 1
2
⌋
= 209 +
⌊−11 + 1
2
⌋
= 204
y′ = l −
⌊
h′
2
⌋
= 209−
⌊−11
2
⌋
= 215
Watermark extraction:
l′ =
⌊
x′ + y′
2
⌋
=
⌊
204 + 215
2
⌋
= 209
h′ = x′ − y′ = 204− 215 = −11
b′ = LSB(h′) = 1
}
//Extraction
h =
⌊
h′
2
⌋
=
⌊−11
2
⌋
= −6
x = l′ +
⌊
h+ 1
2
⌋
= 209 +
⌊−6 + 1
2
⌋
= 206
y = l′ −
⌊
h
2
⌋
= 209−
⌊−6
2
⌋
= 212
The above technique is a form of reversible integer transform called the Haar
wavelet transform that can be applied to a pair of 8-bit pixel values. As can be
seen there is a one-to-one correspondence between (x,y) and (l,h). However, it is
necessary to ensure that the new (x′,y′) values do not overflow/underflow i.e. kept
within the range [0, 255]. This can be represented as:
0 ≤ l +
⌊
h′ + 1
2
⌋
≤ 255 and 0 ≤ l′ −
⌊
h′
2
⌋
≤ 255
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Since l and h are integers, the above condition can lead to:
|h′| ≤ 2(255− l) and |h′| ≤ 2l + 1
In fact, to prevent overflow and underflow, h′ should satisfy:
|h′| ≤ min[2(255− l), 2l + 1]
Or, in other words, it can be formulated as:
|2× h+ b| ≤ min[2(255− l), 2l + 1]
Values of h that satisfy the above condition are termed as expandable values.
Thus only those pixel values will be chosen for DE whose h value is expandable.
The hiding ability of h is log2k, where k is the largest integer such that:
|k × h+ b| ≤ min[2(255− l), 2l + 1], ∀b, 0 ≤ b ≤ k − 1 (6.1)
For this technique, the value of k is chosen to be 2 so the hiding ability of h is
1. The complete watermark embedding algorithm consists of the following stages:
calculating difference values, creating a location map, data embedding using DE
and inverse integer transform.These steps are discussed in detail in [76].
The DE algorithm can be applied to a frame more than once i.e. for an
already embedded P frame, additional payload can be inserted within it but with
a different pairing pattern. The second embedding doesnt perturb the previous
embedding. This is termed as multi-layer embedding. In fact, one payload can be
divided and spread across layers. It can be deduced that each layer has a payload
capacity of less than 0.5bpp. This means that multiple layer embedding has a
capacity of less than M/2bpp where M is the number of layers. Theoretically,
multi-layer embedding could go on to any number of levels. However in practice,
the redundancy keeps on reducing with increasing layers of embedding as more
and more h values violate condition in equation 6.1. The payload size (i.e. the bit
length) is thus limited only by the payload capacity limit.
6.2.2 Intra IPCM macroblocks
In certain rare and unusual situations, when the quantization step size is very
small, thereby generating a high-quality coded video, the H.264 encoding process
can actually lead to an increase in the overall number of bits required to represent
the coded video when compared to the raw uncompressed video. Such a situation
could arise in applications such as content archiving or distribution where a very
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high quality is required. Furthermore, it may be convenient for implementation
reasons to have a reasonably-low identifiable limit on the number of bits necessary
to process in a decoder in order to decode a single macroblock. These issues are
taken care of by another type of intra coding method, called the IPCM macroblock
mode. In this mode, the encoder decides to transmit the sample values without
any prediction, transformation or quantization. In essence, it means that the
samples are sent across as raw pixel values. This mode allows regions of the frame
to be represented without any loss of fidelity. However, as pointed out in [89],
this method is not efficient and neither was it meant to be. It was intended to be
simple and to impose a minimum upper bound on the number of bits that can be
used to represent a macroblock with sufficient accuracy. In fact, if one considers
the bits necessary to indicate which mode has been selected for the macroblock,
the use of the PCM mode actually results in a minor degree of data expansion.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the H.264/AVC encoder rarely
generates an IPCM block. In fact, as part of their experiments, Kapotas and
Skodras [88] were unable to obtain any IPCM macroblock naturally. Thus the
encoder was forced to consider and encode specific macroblocks as IPCM mac-
roblocks. The same strategy has been adopted for the proposed technique as is
discussed in the next section.
6.3 Proposed Watermarking Technique
The H.264 encoder generates an encoded bitstream in the form of slices. Each slice
in turn contains a slice header and a slice payload. Each slice payload contains
within it a number of macroblocks. Each macroblock has a header and a payload.
The header contains information such as prediction mode used to predict the
macroblock. The macroblock payload contains the coded transform coefficients
corresponding to the residual image samples after prediction. However, if the
macroblock has been coded as an IPCM macroblock, then the macroblock payload
contains raw pixel values. The DE watermarking method can only be applied to
pixel values and not to residual coefficients, hence the justification for generating
IPCM macroblocks.
As mentioned in the previous section, the watermarking technique involves
forcibly generating IPCM macroblocks. Thus two steps are added within the
H.264/AVC encoder (labelled as ‘1’ and ‘2’ in Fig.6.3a).
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Fig. 6.3:   Proposed algorithm:   (a) Embedding   (b) Extraction 
 
The first step is ‘IPCM macroblock generation’ and the second step is ‘watermark embedding’. In the first 
step, the encoder’s mode decision process is modified to force it to generate IPCM macroblocks. 
Normally, macroblocks towards the edge of a frame have a lesser degree of motion and detail associated 
with them in contrast to macroblocks located towards the centre of a frame. Therefore, for the proposed 
technique, it was decided to generate one IPCM macroblock in the top-left corner of each P frame (refer 
to Fig. 6.5 later). Generating one IPCM macroblock per frame kept the increase in the total number of bits 
to a minimum. If however, the encoder naturally generates an IPCM macroblock, then even that 
macroblock is utilized to embed the watermark information. A heuristic method could also be used within 
this step to make a more informed decision as to which macroblock should be generated as an IPCM 
macroblock. This decision could be taken on the basis of texture intensity or the amount of motion but at 
the expense of additional complexity. It should be noted that I- and B-frames are not used. Not modifying 
the I-frames lessens the extent of spatio-temporal error propagation since they are more frequently used 
for inter prediction than P-frames. 
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Figure 6.3: Proposed algorithm
The first step of the proposed method is ‘IPCM macroblock generation’, fol-
lowed by ‘watermark embedding’. In the first step, the ncoders ode decision
process s modified to force it t gen rate IPCM mac blocks. Normally mac-
roblocks towards the edge of frame have lesser degree f moti n and detail
associated with them contrast to macr blocks located owards the centre of a
frame. Therefore, f r th proposed tech iq e, it was decided to generate ne IPCM
acroblock in the top-left corner of each P frame (refer to Fig.6.4). Generating one
IPCM macroblock per frame also kept the increase in the total number of bits to a
minimum. If however, the encoder naturally generates an IPCM macroblock, then
even that macroblock is utilized to embed the watermark information. A heuristic
method could also be used within this step to make a more informed decision as
to which macroblock should be generated as an IPCM macroblock. This decision
could be taken on the basis of texture intensity or the amount of motion but at
the expense of additional complexity. It should be noted that I- and B-frames
are not used. Not modifying the I-frames lessens the extent of spatio-temporal
error propagation since they are more frequently used for inter prediction than
P-frames.
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The second step of ‘watermark embedding’ involves accessing the raw pixel
values within the IPCM macroblock generated in the first step and then embedding
a watermark bit within a pair of pixel values on a multi-layer basis using the DE
method. For the results in this article, two-layer embedding was attempted. In
the first layer, the pairing is done vertically followed by horizontal pairing in the
second layer (in fact, a key-based pattern can be used for added security but at
the expense of additional computational overhead). Next, a 1-bit location map
is created which indicates the selected expandable difference values. A value of
‘1’ in the map indicates that h is expandable and ‘0’ otherwise. The size of the
one-bit bitmap is equal to the number of pairs of pixel values. The one-bit bitmap
is then losslessly compressed using run-length coding. In addition, to indicate
to the decoder that multi-layer embedding has been performed, a 16-bit header
information is generated. Finally, the header information, the location map, and
the watermark are combined together to form a payload and embedded into the
video stream as per the procedure outlined in [76].
At the decoder side, the IPCM macroblock within a frame is identified and
decoded. The location map is read and used to identify those pairs of pixel values
that have been expanded for embedding. The payload bits are extracted out of
the expanded pixel values which are then restored back to their original values.
The proposed algorithm utilizes both, the luminance and the chrominance
components within an IPCM macroblock to embed the watermark bits. Theoret-
ically, for an IPCM macroblock with 16×6 luminance (Y) components and 2(8×8)
chrominance (U,V) components, pairing the pixel values would offer a maximum
of [128 (Y) + 32 (U) + 32(V)] = 192 expandable h values per frame for the first
layer. As explained in the previous section, for each successive layer of embed-
ding, the number of possible expandable h values becomes progressively lesser
than the maximum capacity i.e. less than 192. The payload capacity is thus lim-
ited by the total number of expandable h values within all P-slices (frames) of a
video sequence. In general, for a video sequence with ‘F ’ P-frames, the theoretical
maximum available locations ‘C’ to carry the payload can be depicted as:
C =
F∑
i=1
ni
where for a two-layer embedding scheme, each ni = hi1 + hi2, with hi1 and hi2
being the number of possible expandable h values in layer 1 and 2 respectively
within frame i and hi1 > hi2. Fig.6.4 shows a simplified schematic of the proposed
watermark embedding system. The system at the decoder/receiver will follow the
exact reverse sequence of steps in order to extract the watermark and restore the
video.
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6.5 Experimental Results 
 
The two steps outlined in the previous section were implemented within JM.15.1[82] of the H.264 
Reference Software. Standard raw QCIF (YUV, 4:2:0) video samples, namely Akiyo, Carphone, Foreman 
and Mobile were chosen to be encoded and embedded with a watermark; however, only the results 
corresponding to Foreman and Mobile are reported here since other video samples returned similar 
results. The configuration parameter set for the encoder is listed in Table 6.1. The frame encoding 
sequence was chosen to be IPPP.... B frames were not generated since the proposed technique only 
utilized IPCM macroblocks within P slices to carry the watermark. The GOP length was fixed at 16 
which implied that every 16th frame acted as an IDR boundary.  
Table 6.1: Encoder configuration parameters 
Number of frames to encode 300 
Frame Rate 30 frames per second 
Frame Resolution 176 × 144, 4: 2: 0 
IDR Period 16 
Number of B frames Not Used 
Entropy Encoding CABAC 
RD Optimization High Complexity Mode 
 
The performance of the proposed technique was measured with the rate control OFF and then with the 
rate control ON. Under rate control OFF, the value of the quantization parameter (QP) controls the quality 
of the video stream generated. For the experiments reported in this article, the QP was set at 30, 20 and 
10. When the rate control is turned ON, the encoder dynamically adjusts the QP of the video sequence 
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Fig. 6.4: Proposed watermarking system Figure 6.4: Overall system design
6.4 Experimental Results
The two steps outlined in the previous section were implemented wit in JM.15.1
refe ence software [62] of the H.264 Reference Softwar . Standard raw QCIF
YUV(4:2:0) video s mples, namely Akiyo,Carphone,For ma and Mobile were
chos to be encoded and embedded with a watermark; however, only the results
corresponding to Foreman and Mobile are reported here since other video samples
returned similar results. The configuration parameter set for the encoder is listed
in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Encoder configuration parameters
Number of frames to encode 300
Frame rate 30 frames per second
Frame resolution 176×144, 4:2:0
IDR period 16
Number of B frames Not used
Entropy encoding CABAC
RD optimization High complexity mode
The frame encoding sequence was chosen to be IPPP.... B frames were not
generated since the proposed technique only utilized IPCM macroblocks within
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P slices to carry the watermark. The GOP length was fixed at 16 which implied
that every 16th frame acted as an IDR boundary.
The performance of the proposed technique was measured with the rate control
switched OFF and then with the rate control switched ON. Under rate control
OFF, the value of the quantization parameter (QP) controls the quality of the
video stream generated and transmission constraints are not considered. For the
experiments reported in this article, the QP was set at 30, 20 and 10. When the
rate control is turned ON, the encoder dynamically adjusts the QP of the video
sequence being encoded depending upon the constraint limit set. This mechanism
is useful when transmitting H.264 encoded video over a channel that has a limited
bandwidth. For the experiments in this category, the encoder constraints were
set at 60kbps, 50kbps and 40kbps. These are considered to be typical bitrates
when transmitting video content over the internet. The graphs for the bitrate and
PSNR variation with the rate control OFF and then for the rate control ON are
shown in Fig.6.5 and 6.6 respectively.
From the results shown in the rate control OFF category, it can be seen that
there is a negligible variation in both, the bitrate and PSNR values under increas-
ing payload. The range of variation for the bitrate and the PSNR are depicted in
Table 6.2 which indicates that embedding such a high payload does not have any
significant impact on the R-D characteristics. A comparison is also made with the
technique reported in [88] and is depicted in Table 6.3. It can be seen that the
maximum variation of bitrate and PSNR within the proposed technique is much
lower than the technique reported in [88].
!
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Figure 6.5: Bitrate and PSNR variation with rate control OFF
Table 6.2: R-D characteristics with rate control OFF
Range of bitrate variation (%) Range of PSNR variation (%)
Video
sequence
QP=30 QP=20 QP=10 QP=30 QP=20 QP=10
0.619 0.157 0.043 −0.006 −0.023 −0.088
Foreman to to to to to to
0.755 0.217 0.047 −0.008 −0.030 −0.104
0.213 0.047 0.015 −0.003 −0.035 −0.127
Mobile to to to to to to
0.237 0.053 0.018 −0.006 −0.048 −0.153
The above observations show that the proposed technique performs better than
the one reported in [88] when it comes to bitrate variation while at the same time
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Table 6.3: Maximum variation characteristics with rate control OFF
Proposed method Method proposed in [88]
QP=30 QP=20 QP=30 QP=20
Video
sequence
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Foreman 0.75 –0.008 0.21 –0.03 3.5 –0.04 0.75 –0.2
Mobile 0.23 –0.006 0.05 –0.04 1.3 –0.01 0.14 –0.09
offering almost similar characteristics when it comes to PSNR variation.
The technique also exhibited a similar smooth performance with the rate con-
trol turned ON. It can however, be seen from Fig.6.6 and Table 6.4 that the range
of variation, both for PSNR and bitrate, is higher than with the rate control
turned OFF. In particular, Mobile exhibits a rather broad variation. However,
the apparent wide variation in the bitrate and PSNR values in this case is due
to the fact that Mobile is a high detail video sequence with a good amount of
motion and forcing the encoder to generate an IPCM macroblock (under the wa-
termarking technique) leads to an appreciable increase in the bitrate. Another
reason for the sudden wide variation depends on the embedding capacity of spe-
cific frame/frames. This implies that higher is the payload embedded within a
frame, higher will be the bitrate and PSNR variation exhibited at that point
within the embedding process. For example, looking at the bitrate variation for
Foreman in Fig.6.6, it can be seen that there is a sudden jump at around the
10,000 bit payload mark. This implies that the frame at this point in the video
sequence was embedded with a large number of watermark bits since possibly all
pixel-pairs were valid candidates to carry the watermark payload.
With the rate control ON, the proposed technique was again compared with
the technique in [88]. The results are depicted in Table 6.5. It can be seen
that maximum reduction in the PSNR for the proposed technique is relatively
lower than the technique proposed in [88], although not by a significant margin.
However, in agreement with the technique reported in [88], the cost of obtaining
a much smoother performance within the proposed technique has been put on
the PSNR. The proposed technique, however, offers a smoother performance at
very low bitrates. For instance, at 40kbps where the degradation in the PSNR
value is 0.26dB at the most(see values for Mobile in Table 6.4). This is lesser than
the figure in [88] which reported a degradation factor of 0.43dB even at a higher
bitrate of 60kbps.
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Figure 6.6: Bitrate and PSNR variation with rate control ON
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Table 6.4: R-D characteristics with rate control ON
Range of bitrate variation (%) Range of PSNR variation (%)
Video
sequence
60kbps 50kbps 40kbps 60kbps 50kbps 40kbps
0.914 1.302 1.716 −0.081 −0.053 −0.017
Foreman to to to to to to
1.029 1.432 2.008 −0.097 −0.070 −0.034
0.925 0.909 0.898 −0.117 −0.155 −0.039
Mobile to to to to to to
0.985 0.982 0.970 −0.236 −0.314 −0.269
Table 6.5: Maximum variation characteristics with rate control ON
Proposed method Method proposed in [88]
60kbps 50kbps 60kbps 50kbps
Video
sequence
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Bitrate
(%)
PSNR
(%)
Foreman 1.02 –0.09 1.43 –0.07 N/A –0.24 N/A –0.36
Mobile 0.98 –0.23 0.98 –0.31 N/A –0.23 N/A –0.34
Next, the payload capacity was compared to the values reported in [88] and [90].
In order to perform a fair comparison, the encoder was set to exactly the same
configuration as that mentioned in [88]. The results are shown in Table 6.6 which
prove that the proposed technique offers a much higher payload capacity when
compared to the values reported in [88] and [90]. In fact, embedding one bit per h
under a two layer embedding scheme, the proposed technique is capable of hiding,
on an average, 159.01 bits per QCIF frame in contrast to 61.4 bits per QCIF frame
as reported in [88]. The payload values for the proposed technique contain within
them not only the actual watermark bits but also the compressed location map
and the header information. The average size of the compressed location map for
this set of experiments was found to be 21.7 bits per IPCM macroblock/frame for
a two-layer embedding. Thus, the average size of the location map to be embedded
for a 300 frame video sequence (for instance, Grandma) is 6097.7 bits. This value
combined with a 16-bit header information (indicating multi-layer watermarking)
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leaves out an actual watermark capacity of [48000−(6097.7+16)] = 41886.3 bits
on an average, which is significantly higher than the capacities reported for the
other two techniques. It should be noted that the maximum theoretical payload
capacity of 48000 bits is obtained when B frames are present within the video
sequence and which were not considered as candidates for watermark embedding.
Having a video sequence consisting of I- and P-frames only would obviously allow
a much higher embedding capacity, as is shown in Table 6.7.
Table 6.6: Comparison of payload capacity
Payload (bits)
Video sequence Proposed technique Method Method
300 frames (IBPBP..) Layer1 Layer2 in [88] in [90]
Grandma 25344 48000 15360 12352
Bridge-close 25328 46288 15360 11748
News 25344 48000 18432 9972
Silent 25344 48000 18432 17368
Finally, the computational efficiency of the proposed algorithm was analyzed
by taking into the account the time taken by the modified H.264/AVC encoder
to encode a video sequence and embed the payload. The results are shown in
Table 6.7. As can be seen, the increase in total encoding time is around 3% on
an average, which makes the technique ideal for real time applications. The small
computational overhead is due to the usage of simple mathematical operations for
watermark embedding.
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Table 6.7: Encoding time for the proposed technique
One IPCM macroblock per P frame
Watermark payload Total encoding time for 300 frames (secs)
Video sequence Layer1 Layer2 Un-watermarked Watermarked (2 layers)
Akiyo 53671 89639 1450.1 1491.7
Carphone 53952 87052 1428.0 1470.2
Foreman 49855 84226 1622.7 1661.2
Mobile 52586 90879 1434.2 1495.4
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a reversible watermarking technique was proposed which was
based on the concept of difference expansion. The idea of embedding the wa-
termark within the difference values of a pair of pixels had already been proved
in [88] to offer the luxury of embedding a high payload. This concept was utilized
within the H.264/AVC encoder by forcing it to generate a single IPCM macrob-
lock within each P frame and applying DE on its pixel values. The performance of
the proposed technique was tested on a variety of video sequences and was found
to be capable of embedding a much higher payload than other similar reported
algorithms. In addition, the proposed technique also exhibited encouraging R-D
characteristics even at low birates. The embedded watermark being reversible, is
fragile in nature which is a desirable trait when the requirement is to detect tam-
pering within the video. Since the technique embeds the watermark in the spatial
domain, it is resistant to common errors such as drift and other visual artifacts
which are characteristic of compressed and transform domain techniques. Finally,
the technique exhibits a very low computational complexity as the watermark em-
bedding operation involves simple mathematical operations. This makes it ideal
for hand-held devices and real-time application. Being a fragile watermarking
method, the proposed technique would be vulnerable against the same category
of attacks as mentioned in the previous chapter. However, improvements can be
made by improving the choice of the macroblock to be encoded as an IPCM mac-
roblock. A highly textured/detailed macroblock will always be encoded using low
quantization parameters so as to retain most of its information. Choosing such a
macroblock to be encoded as an IPCM macroblock and then embedding the pay-
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load within it would ensure that the watermark is not completely removed. But
this would be at the expense of a higher resulting bitrate and added complexity.
The results of the proposed watermarking technique were published in [91–93] and
an extension of the method is under review at [94]
Chapter 7
Content Based Copy Detection
This Chapter introduces an efficient video copy detection method for the H.264/AVC
standard. The mechanism is based on content based copy detection (CBCD). The
proposed method divides each frame within a group of consecutive frames into a
grid. Each corresponding grid across these groups of frames is then sorted in an
ordinal vector which describes both, the spatial as well as the temporal variation.
This ordinal matrix based copy-detection scheme is effective in not only detect-
ing a copied video clip but also its location within a longer video sequence. The
technique has been designed to work in the compressed domain which makes it
computationally very efficient and hence suitable for a large class of application
domains. The proposed mechanism was tested on a number of video sequences
containing copies which had undergone a variety of modifications. The results
prove that the proposed technique is capable of detecting these copies.
7.1 Introduction
Ordinal measures have proven to be the best method for matching video sequences
in order to detect copies [103]. As with any video sequence matching method,
this approach also has its roots in image matching methodologies. The most
straightforward approach is by applying ordinal measures to every frame within
a video sequence and then matching the resulting ordinal matrix fame-by-frame.
However, this method is clearly inefficient since it fails to exploit the temporal
characteristics of a video sequence.
Video can be considered to be a sequence of activity over a period of time.
Each frame within a video sequence captures a part of that activity. These frames
have a specific temporal sequence in order to depict the complete trajectory of
that activity. Therefore, in order to design an effective video matching system,
two factors have to be considered: the temporal order of the frames and the length
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of the video sequence. This means that in order to effectively detect a copy of a
video sequence, spatio-temporal signatures should be utilized. Ordinal measures
are quite capable of capturing and producing such a signature. Since temporal
information is also captured, it offers the luxury of searching a video database for
a specific kind of activity. For instance, in a database containing videos of football
matches, queries can be made to search for all clips that show a goal being scored.
Such a query cannot be made if the signature is solely based on spatial features.
CBCD methods have found acceptance in a number of applications such as
detecting online copies of videos on torrents and media tracking. Media track-
ing involves detecting the usage of a specific piece of media in terms of its time,
location and frequency. This method has found widespread acceptance in the mar-
keting and advertising sector especially for TV broadcasts, where a competitor’s
commercial can be tracked to obtain relevant information. The tracking results
can be used for copyright management, claim unfair practices or royalty payments.
Another interesting usage of CBCD methods is to improve the search results of
multimedia search engines where copies of the searched-for digital media could be
removed before displaying the search results thereby reducing redundancy.
In CBCD methods, usually a shorter query clip is matched to a longer target
clip in order to detect if a copy of the former exists as a copy within the latter. If
a copy is detected then it is desirable that the detection mechanism also identifies
the location of the copy. This is usually termed as temporal localization [48].
Video copy detection mechanisms that are based on key-frame (image) matching
methodology will obviously be unable to perform this step.
H.264 video uses a number of novel methods to encode not just the spatial
features but also temporal ones. The system proposed in this chapter utilizes
some of these novel methods to generate an ordinal spatio-temporal signature. The
technique was designed with an initial premise that a copy detection mechanism
for H.264 video based on these methods will provide a much better performance
as compared to using any other generic feature such as luminance values.
7.2 Existing CBCD Systems
As mentioned in Section 3.6, CBCD methods usually extract a signature from the
video sequence. The signature can be extracted from spatial features such as lu-
minance, from colour information such as the histogram of pixel values, temporal
features such as motion vectors or even a combination of these features. Using
spatial and colour features only for copy detection can be treated as a problem
of image signature matching since these methods do not take into account the
temporal nature of the video. Conversely, techniques developed using only tem-
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poral characteristics are ineffective against simple image processing operations
such changes in luminance, contrast, colour etc. The following paragraphs outline
some of the CBCD methods in each of the above mentioned domains.
One of the earliest CBCD methods based on spatial features was proposed by
Bhat and Nayar [48] wherein the ordinal measure of every frame in the clip was
computed and then matched to detect copies. This was achieved by dividing each
frame into N×N blocks and sorting the average intensities of each block within
that frame to give a rank matrix. Detecting copies can then be considered to be a
problem of matching the rank matrices frame-by-frame between the original and
copied videos. Lee and Yoo [95] designed a video fingerprinting method based on
the centroid of gradient orientations. This method was claimed to be resistant
towards most of the common video processing steps such as resizing, compression,
frame rate change etc. Other spatial techniques such as those based on differential
luminance [96]and edge detection [97,98] have also been proposed.
Colour based CBCD methods are usually based on generating a unique signa-
ture from the colour histogram. Lienhart, Kuhmunch and Effelsberg [99] proposed
a method where the colour coherence vector was used to characterize key frames
of a video clip. Sanchez, Binefa and Radeva [100] proposed the use of principal
colour components within the histogram of key frames for copy detection.
A number of techniques based on the temporal nature of video sequences have
also been proposed. Indyk, Iyengar and Shivkumar [101] proposed some of the
earliest CBCD methods based on exploiting the temporal characteristics of video.
They treated the time duration between shot transitions as a unique signature.
Radhakrishnan and Bauer [102] used the frame difference method based on pro-
jections of difference images between consecutive video images to extract a robust
signature. They claimed the method to be resistant towards signal processing
operations such as changes in luminance, compression, resolution changes and
scaling. Hampapur, Hyun and Bolle [103] designed a copy detection technique
based on motion vectors.
However, early experiments proved that ordinal signature based CBCD sys-
tems offer the most promising results. In fact, it has been proved in [103] that
ordinal measurements not only offer the best performance when it comes to detect-
ing copies but also in terms of computational efficiency. Consequently, a number
of techniques have been proposed over recent years that are based on the or-
dinal signature approach. Some of them are briefly outlined as follows. Kim [45]
proposed an ordinal measure of DCT coefficients which was based on the relative
ordering of AC magnitude values. This method offers better performance than the
ordinal measure of intensity, which is unable to detect basic operations such as
horizontal or vertical flipping of images. Kim and Vasudev [49] combined the spa-
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tial and temporal features of video to design a spatiotemporal sequence matching
system. The system combined spatial matching of ordinal signatures and tem-
poral matching of temporal signatures to detect copies. Chen and Stentiford [50]
designed a CBCD system based on temporal ordinal measurements. Each frame
was divided into a 2×2 grid and corresponding grids were sorted in an ordinal
ranking sequence along a time series. This measurement captured both, the local
and global description of temporal variation. Nie et. al. [51] partitioned the key
frames into blocks and computed their ordinal measure. Then they evaluated its
64-point DCT and extracted a fingerprint out of it after discarding some of its
components. This fingerprint was utilized to detect copies and it was claimed to
be quite efficient in detecting copies in long video sequences.
Categorizing CBCD methods in terms of spatial, transform or compressed
domain is another way of approaching the problem. Spatial [52,100]and transform
domain [45, 51] techniques though computationally more expensive, are simpler
and more straightforward in design. Conversely, compressed domain approaches
require a more in-depth understanding of the resulting bitstream in order to design
the system but are usually more efficient computationally. A couple of compressed
domain approaches based on motion vectors are reported in [53,103] and another
technique utilizing transform coded coefficients is presented in [54].
The idea proposed in this chapter is to design a compressed domain CBCD
method based on the spatiotemporal ordinal measurement. This would combine
the high performance of spatiotemporal based ordinal measures with the compu-
tational efficiency of compressed domain approaches. The algorithm is designed
based on features and characteristics that are unique to the H.264/AVC codec.
7.3 Proposed CBCD System
It can be seen from Section 7.2, that most of the CBCD systems are either spatial
or temporal-only systems. Spatial-only systems are inefficient when it comes to
detecting copies of video sequences since they fail to capture the temporal charac-
teristics such as the sense of motion. Temporal-only systems, on the other hand,
would be clearly ineffective against simple changes to video sequences such as
changes in colour,contrast,luminance etc. [49].
Thus, it is clear that a combination of spatial and temporal information offers
the most efficient way to match videos.To realize a spatio-temporal based system
for matching H.264 videos, it was imperative to identify those aspects of the
H.264/AVC encoder that generate the relevant information and combine them
together to generate unique signatures. Looking at the functioning of the encoder
at different parameter settings, it was found that 4×4 intrapredicted macroblocks
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within the I-frames as well as P- and B-skip macroblocks within P- and B- frames
respectively, were capable of retaining both, spatial and temporal information.
We further argue that any modifications to the video might change the number
of 4×4 intrapredicted, P- and B-skip macroblocks in each of the respective frames
but the ordinal rank matrix built out of these frames would not be perturbed since
the change would be consistent across these frames. Hence, they could be used
as candidates to generate spatiotemporal signatures for a given video sequence.
However, before going further with this discussion, we first briefly explain the
concept behind the above mentioned macroblocks.
7.3.1 4×4 Intrapredicted Macroblocks
As explained in Section 2.2, intra-prediction [104] is a new technique that has been
incorporated in the H.264 AVC video standard. In this mode, sample values of
some macroblocks are predicted from neighboring macroblocks of the same frame.
The predicted block is normally termed as prediction block P . For the luminance
samples, P can be formed either using intra 4×4 or intra 16×16 mode. The intra
4×4 mode is used in the detailed and high motion areas of the frame, while the
intra 16×16 mode is used in the smooth and the stationary areas of the frame.
There are a total of 9 optional prediction modes for the intra 4×4 luminance block,
4 modes for 16×16 luminance block and 4 modes for the chrominance components.
Fig.7.1a below illustrates an I-frame with most of the macroblocks being encoded
using the intra 4×4 mode.
7.3.2 P skip and B skip Macroblocks
During inter-frame prediction within P- and B-frames, if the amount and degree
of motion is quite low, then rather than using motion compensated macroblock
modes, such macroblocks can be encoded as “skip type” macroblocks (see Section
2.3). For such type of macroblocks, neither a quantized prediction error signal,
nor a motion vector or a reference index parameter is transmitted. Such “skipped”
macroblocks are reconstructed by referencing the frame located at index 0 in the
multipicture buffer (which is in fact, similar to how a P 16×16 macroblock would
be reconstructed) [104]. P and B skip macroblocks are very useful in encoding
large areas within a frame that have no change or a slow constant motion like
panning by reducing the actual number of bits that are transmitted. Fig.7.1b and
7.1c depict a B- and a P-frame with B skip and P skip macroblocks respectively.
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useful in encoding large areas within a frame that have no change or a slow constant motion like panning 
by reducing the actual number of bits that are transmitted. Fig. 7.1(b) and (c) depict a B- and a P-frame 
with B_skip and P_skip macroblocks. 
 
 
 
                          
(a)                                                       (b)                                                         (c)   
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C. Signature design 
Kim and Vasudev [100] showed that an ordinal matrix obtained by partitioning the frame into 2×2 regions 
is robust to most common modifications that can be done on a video sequence. In line with this argument, 
we begin by dividing the frames into 2×2 regions and representing them as TL (Top Left), TR (Top 
Right) ,BL (Bottom Left), BR(Bottom Right). We then count, in all the four regions, the number of 4×4 
intra-predicted macroblocks within the I-frame, the number of B_skip macroblocks within the B-frame 
and the number of P_skip macroblocks within the P-frame. The resulting counts in each of the 
corresponding regions for each frame are then ranked as an ordinal vector along the time line. These 
vectors are then combined together to give the final ordinal matrix which acts as the signature. Fig.7.2 
below explains how the signature is generated using a combination of three different frame types. 
Fig.7.2(a) depicts the division of frames into 2×2 regions. In order to ensure that the macroblock count in 
each region of the frame is an integer, it may be necessary to divide the frame into unequal regions. 
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Figure 7.1: Sample video frames encoded under the H.264 standard
7.3.3 Signature Design
Kim and Vasudev [49] showed that an ordinal matrix obtained by partitioning
the frame into 2×2 regions is robust to most common modifications that can be
done on a video sequence. In line with this argument, we begin by dividing the
frames into 2×2 regions and representing them as TL (Top Left), TR (Top Right)
,BL (Bottom Left), BR(Bottom Right). We then count, in all the four regions,
the number of 4×4 intra-predicted macroblocks within the I-frame, the number
of B skip macroblocks within the B-frame and the number of P skip macroblocks
within the P-frame. The resulting counts in each of the corresponding regions
for ea h frame are then ranked as an ordinal vector along the time line. These
vect rs are th n combined together to give the final ordinal atrix which act
as the signature. Fig.7.2 below explains how the signature is generated using a
combination of three different frame types. Fig.7.2a depicts the division of frames
into 2×2 regions. In order to ensure that the macroblock count in each region of
the frame is an integer, it may be necessary to divide the frame into unequal-sized
regions. However, we still attempt to keep the division as equal as possible. For
instance, if the frame resolution is 176×144 then there would be 11 macroblocks
along the x-axis and 9 macroblocks along the y-axis as illustrated in Fig.7.2a.
Hence in this case, the division was made after the 5th macroblock along the
x- and the y-axis, starting from the top-left corner macroblock. In general, the
approach adopted is:
xpartition =
⌊
MBCountx
2
⌋
, ypartition =
⌈
MBCounty
2
⌉
where,
MBCountx=total number of macroblocks along the x-axis
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MBCounty=total number of macroblocks along the y-axis
xpartition= vertical partition line after xth macroblock along the x-axis
ypartition= horizontal partition line after yth macroblock along the y-axis
The arrows in Fig.7.2b depict the macroblock count in the TL regions of the
three frames being compared to generate the first row (vector) of the ordinal rank
matrix. Similarly, the macroblock count from the remaining three regions can be
used to realize the final ordinal matrix of Fig.7.2c.
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(a) Frame division into 2×2 regions
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(b) Count of relevant macroblocks within each region
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(c) Spatiotemporal ordinal matrix
Figure 7.2: Signature generation for an H.264 encoded video
7.3.4 Matching Methodology
Usually H.264/AVC coded video uses a GOP length of 12 or 24 frames [105]
within the PAL standard. This GOP length provides an optimum balance between
compression ratio and the quality of the video. Accordingly, for the experiments
carried out, the query and the target video samples were divided into GOP lengths
of 12. The first three frames at the beginning of every GOP were utilized to build
a part of the signature. The justification behind choosing only three frames to
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build part-signatures was the simple fact that every H.264 encoded video sequence
consists of only three types of frame: I,B and P. Using one frame of each type
to build the part-signature was enough to capture the characteristics of a coded
video sequence.
These part signatures were concatenated to constitute the complete signature
of a given video sequence. The matching process was performed according to the
mechanism shown in Fig.7.3. The signature is extracted from the query video clip
as shown in Fig.7.3a. Similarly, signatures are extracted from every subsequence
within the target video as shown in Fig.7.3b.It should be noted that each sub-
sequence has the same GOP length as the target video except possibly the last
(i.e. M′). Figure 7.3c depicts the matching process.
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Fig. 7.2:  Signature generation:   (a) Frame division into a 2×2 regions    (b) Counting relevant macroblocks in 
each frame    (c) Spatiotemporal ordinal matrix 
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(a) Extracting a part of the signature from the first three frames of every GOP within a sequence
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(b) Extracting signatures from each subsequence using the method in (a)
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(c) Matching query video to target video for detecting copies
Figure 7.3: Signature generation and matching within H.264 video sequence
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The problem of detecting copies of a given query video involves detecting not
only whether a copy exists within a target video but also determining its loca-
tion. We can formalize the problem by defining a few notations and symbols as
follows. Let the query video be denoted as VQ = {v1q , v2q , v3q , ......, vmq } and the
target video as VT = {v1t , v2t , v3t , ....., vnt } with M and N being the total number
of frames within the query and target videos respectively and where, M << N .
A subsequence within VT is defined as V
r
T where r ∈ [r : r + M − 1], with the
number of frames being M and 0 ≤ r ≤ n−N . Further let each frame within VT
or VQ be denoted as Vi = {vi[0], vi[1], .....vi[p]} with P being the total number of
partitions within each frame. Then the ranking matrix of partition p within VQ
={v1q,p, v2q,p, v3q,p, ....., vMq,p} can be denoted as piq,p. The size of each piq,p would be
of the order of [1×M ]. Similarly, any subsequence within the target video V rT =
{vrt,p, vr+1t,p , vr+2t,p , ....., vr+M−1t,p } can be denoted as pirt,p also with a size of [1×M ].
We can then define the problem of detecting copies as follows. Given a target
video VT , we say that a subsequence, V
r
T from VT is a copy of VQ if the distance
D(VQ, V
r
T ) is below a threshold  ∈ [0, 1]. The distance measure D is calculated
as:
D(VQ, V
r
T ) =
1
P
P∑
p=1
d(piq,p, pi
r
t,p)
and where d is calculated as:
d(piq,p, pi
r
t,p) =
1
C
M∑
i=1
|piq,p(i)− pirt,p(r + i− 1)|
Each d is the normalized distance between two rank matrices. C is the max-
imum distance between two rank matrices pik and pij ,∀(pik, pij) ∈ SP ,with SP
being the set of all possible rank matrices with size P . C is obtained when the
two rank permutations are reverse of each other. It is calculated as:
C =
M∑
i=1
|M + 1− (2× i)|
For the experiments reported in this Chapter, we used P = 4; hence C = 8.The
copy detection mechanism proceeds as shown in Algorithm 2.
A sample functioning of Algorithm 2 is shown in Fig.7.4. In this example, it is
assumed that subsequence V 3T is a copy of VQ. The matching and detection proced-
ure deduces D(VQ, V
3
T ) as being less than  and accordingly flags the subsequence
as a copy and pinpoints its location within VT .
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input : VQ=Query video clip;
VT=Target video sequence;
=Matching detection threshold;
output: Copied video sequence V r∗T and its location i within VT
1 Initialize r = 0, i = 0, gop length = 12, Dv[n−N ]=0;
2 while r ≤n-N do
3 Calculate D(VQ, V
r
T ) and store in Dv[i];
4 increase i by 1;
5 increase r by gop length;
6 Locate minimum value Dmin within Dv[i];
7 if Dmin <  then
8 Declare corresponding V rT as a copy and i as the location of the copy
within VT ;
Algorithm 2: Copy detection methodology
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Figure 7.4: An instance of Algorithm 2
7.3.5 Compressed Domain Matching
The H.264 encoder generates an encoded bitstream in the form of slices. Each slice
in turn contains a slice header and a slice payload. Each slice payload contains
within it a number of macroblocks. Each macroblock has a header and a payload.
The macroblock header contains the information regarding the macroblock type.
Since signature generation within the proposed method is based on the number of
macroblocks of a specific type; to match a video for detecting copies, it is only ne-
cessary to partially decode the H.264 bitstream, read the macroblock type within
each of the 2×2 regions and construct the signature. Since the complexity of the
H.264 codec is quite high, complete decoding of H.264 video bitstream, extract-
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ing the signature and then re-encoding it would incur a significant computational
cost. Designing a compressed domain CBCD system avoids this overhead. Fi-
nally, compressed domain CBCD systems are becoming more popular for all video
standards since nearly all of the video content at present is in compressed form,
either for transmission, distribution or storage. However, H.264 has been largely
ignored as a standard when it comes to CBCD systems. This work is an attempt
bridge a part of this gap.
7.4 Experimental Results
The system was implemented within the JM Reference Software version 15.1 [62].
A requirement of using this software was that it accepts only raw YUV files as
input. It was not possible to obtain a significant database of YUV files to test the
proposed system as there are only limited numbers of YUV QCIF (176×144) video
sequences available online [106]. A set of 24 different video sequences with different
lengths were however obtained. These video sequences covered almost all subjects
like news, sports, scenery, architecture, interviews etc. These were concatenated
to realize a longer target video sequence of 13,372 frames. Subsequences of length
30, 50, 100 and 150 frames were randomly selected from the above video sequence
and 13 different transformations were applied to simulate copied video sequences.
They were: increase brightness by 25%, decrease brightness by 25%, increase
contrast by 25%, decrease contrast by 25%, decrease frame size down to 80%,
increase frame size up to 120%, temporal smoothening, motion blurring, Gaussian
radius-2 blurring, general convolution, decreasing frame rate down to 0.8 times
the original rate, increasing frame rate upto 1.2 times the original rate and letter
box. A few snapshots of these transformations are shown in Fig.7.5. Query videos
clips of lengths 30, 50, 100 and 150 frames were then matched to the target video
using the procedure outlined in the previous section.
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The proposed algorithm was tested for varying values of  and the receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) curve was plotted as shown in Fig.7.6. This plot
depicts the false positive rate (FPR) versus the false negative rate (FNR). These
rates are calculated as follows. Let FN be the number of false negatives i.e. number
of copy-clips undetected and FP be the number of false positives i.e. number of
non-copy clips detected as a copy. Further, let NT be the total number of non-copy
clips and NC be the total number of copy clips. Then for a specific value of , the
FPR and FNR can be calculated as:
FNR() =
FN
NC
, FPR() =
FP
NT
!
Figure 7.6: ROC curve for FPR versus FNR
The ideal ROC curve would pass through the origin. This implies that closer
the ROC curve passes by the origin; the better is the performance of the algorithm.
As can be seen from Fig.7.6, the ROC curve for the proposed technique is closest
to the origin when the video length is 50 frames. Interestingly, when the query
video length is either decreased to 30 or increased to 100 frames and then further
up to 150 frames, the ROC curve moves further away from the origin. Partic-
ularly, using a 30 frame query video length fails to capture the spatiotemporal
similarities between an original video clip and its copy thereby leading to a higher
false negative rate. As a result, the query video length for the proposed CBCD
system can be fixed at 50 frames to guarantee optimum performance. Figure 7.6
also indicates that the FPR and FNR rates for the proposed algorithm are higher
than the technique proposed by Kim and Vasudev [49] but lower than the one
proposed by Mohan [107]. However, the proposed algorithm is computationally
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much more efficient than both the above mentioned approaches. The above claim
is due to two factors. First, the matching process within the proposed technique
uses only 3 frames per GOP in contrast to every frame as was reported in [49]
and [107]. Second, the proposed technique is a compressed domain algorithm
while the other two are spatial domain techniques.
Another measure of the performance of any CBCD algorithm is to compute
the precision and the recall rates for varying threshold values. These parameters
are calculated as follows:
Precision() =
number of copy clips successfully detected leaving out false positives
number of clips detected as a copy including false positives
Recall() =
number of copy clips successfully detected leaving out false positives
total number of actual copy clips
Fig.7.7 shows the precision and recall rates plotted against normalized threshold
values. The plot also includes the precision and recall rates reported in [49] and
[107]. Kim and Vasudev [49] compared their method to the one proposed in [107]
at a threshold value of =0.1. It can be seen from Fig.7.7 that at this threshold
value, both the precision and recall rates for the proposed technique are higher
than those reported in [49] and [107]. Even though the precision and recall rates
are highest at a video query length of 30 frames, due to the poor ROC obtained
(refer to Fig.7.6), we claim that optimum performance from the proposed system
can be obtained at a query length of 50 frames when  = 0.1.
!
!
!
(a)
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Figure 7.7: Precision and recall rates versus normalized threshold
Fig.7.8 shows the precision and recall rates for the proposed technique at dif-
ferent query lengths as well the rates reported in [49]and [107]. These values have
again been obtained at = 0.1. As can be seen, the proposed method offers very
encouraging results. Even though the recall rate is comparable to the method
proposed in [49] however, the precision rate is much higher which signifies that
there are less false detections within the proposed system even with such short
length query videos.
!
Figure 7.8: Performance evaluation by measuring precision and recall rates
The final evaluation of the proposed technique was in terms of the time taken
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to detect a copy. It is obvious that the proposed technique would be efficient since
only the first 3 frames of each GOP within a sequence are used to generate the
signature in contrast to every frame. In particular only 3343 frames out of the
above mentioned video sequence of 13,372 frames will play a role in the matching
process. The copy detection time is computed from the time the signature is
extracted out of the frames and matched. As per this condition, the time taken
to match a 50 frame query video to the target video on a Pentium 4 PC, 3.4 GHz
and 3GB of RAM was 0.38 seconds. The low detection time is also due to the
fact that only partial decoding of the H.264/AVC bitstream is required in order
to count the macroblock type.
Finally, looking at the memory requirements, generating a three frame part-
signature within each GOP and with each frame having 4 partitions gives a size of
12 bytes. With a GOP size of 12, a 50 frame query video sequence would have 5
GOP boundaries. This would give a total signature size of 60 bytes per video clip,
which is significantly low when considering memory and storage requirements.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a compressed domain CBCD system designed to detect
video copies encoded with the H.264/AVC standard. The proposed technique
utilized a feature unique to the H.264/AVC standard wherein different regions of a
frame and different types of frames are encoded as different macroblock types. The
proposed technique uses a short sequence of 3 frames (I, B, P) at the beginning of
every GOP within a given video clip to construct a spatiotemporal signature. This
is done by reading the various macroblock types from a partially decoded H.264
bitstream. This method of signature extraction makes the proposed technique not
only computationally efficient but also resistant to common video editing effects
such as frame rate change/frame dropping. In addition, use of ordinal methods to
construct the signature guarantees that the proposed technique is resistant towards
frame resizing, letter-box and other common video processing steps. Finally, since
the proposed technique is a compressed domain method with a low processor and
memory footprint, it is also suitable for devices with limited computing resources
such as smartphones, PDAs or portable video players. Future work could include a
look into using other macroblock types such as 16×8 or 8×16 in order to develop a
more accurate and robust signature. The result of this work have been submitted
for publication at [108] and is currently under review.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This work was an attempt to address the issue of Digital Rights Management
(DRM) specifically for H.264 Video. DRM can be applied using a number of
techniques and some of these were explored within the scope of this work. Section
8.1 highlights the milestones and deliverables achieved during the course of this
work while section 8.2 provides suggestions for future work.
8.1 Milestones and Deliverables
Using computationally intensive techniques such as encryption to enforce DRM
encounters hurdles when it comes to H.264 video. This is due to the fact that the
standard caters to a large class of application domains and devices some of which
may not possess sufficient computational resources to decrypt the content in a
reasonable amount of time and commence playback. Recognizing this aspect, it
was decided during the course of this work, to explore other computationally effi-
cient options to enforce DRM. The resulting work proposed a number of methods
based on content and copyright protection, content authentication and content
based copy detection.
The robust watermarking algorithm proposed in Chapter 4 was designed to
protect H.264 content and to verify proof of ownership. This was done by util-
izing the DC residuals within 4×4 intrapredicted macroblocks. It was proposed
that since DC residuals are resistant towards most of the common signal pro-
cessing steps, a watermark embedded within them would be robust enough to
repel any attacks. Further, such a watermark would also be resistant towards
compression. The proposed technique was evaluated for its R-D characteristics
which were found to be encouraging while the watermarked video suffered no sig-
nificant quality degradation. The technique was proven to be resistant to common
signal processing attacks. However, the technique suffers from two drawbacks: (1)
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Since the choice of DC residuals to carry the payload is made randomly, a “key”
which identifies these macroblocks (containing the chosen DC residual) has to be
sent across to the decoder in order to extract the watermark. This constitutes
supplementary information and hence the technique is not self-contained. (2) The
technique would be vulnerable against an attack such as transcoding which could
change the prediction mode and hence the residual values. This would mean fail-
ure to extract the watermark. However, this technique offers better robustness
than the technique proposed in [58] wherein AC residuals are used as embedding
locations.
In Chapter 5 and 6, an attempt was made to explore another aspect of water-
marking i.e. fragile watermarks. This category of watermark is used for content
authentication. Fragile watermarks can be irreversible and reversible. The tech-
nique proposed in Chapter 5 was an irreversible watermarking approach while
the one proposed in Chapter 6 was a reversible one. The method presented in
Chapter 5 operates during the CAVLC entropy encoding stage by embedding the
watermark bits within the last coefficient of a 4×4 quantized block of an I-frame.
Since the embedding takes place after entropy encoding and just before bitstream
formation, it is essentially a compressed domain approach. In addition, due to the
embedding being performed within the highest AC coefficients, any unauthorized
modifications to the host video would easily perturb the watermark and hence
indicate tampering. Thus the effectiveness of this method lies in not just its abil-
ity to authenticate a genuine user but also to detect tampering, if any. Attacks
were simulated on the proposed method and the watermark extracted to check for
tampering. A detector was set up at the receiver side and it was found that the
technique is sensitive enough to detect most of the attacks such as transcoding,
rotation, median filtering and cropping. The technique was also compared with
the techniques in [69, 72–74] and was found to exhibit better R-D characteristics
for a wide range of quantization parameters. The use of simple mathematical
operations also guarantees its computation efficiency.
Chapter 6 discussed a reversible watermarking technique based on Difference
Expansion (DE). Since all reversible watermarking techniques are fragile in nature,
the method proposed in this chapter is also useful for content authentication.
In this method, the technique of DE was applied on IPCM macroblocks within
P-frames to embed a high capacity payload. Using P-frames only served two
purposes: (1) Reduces the amount of drift since they are not used as frequently
as I-frames for interprediction. (2) P-frames occur more frequently than I-frames
and hence offer more embedding “space”. The technique of DE offers multi-layer
watermark embedding which is unique. The proposed technique utilized both, the
luminance and the chrominance components to embed the payload in a reversible
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way. The performance of the proposed technique was evaluated under a number of
encoding parameters, namely, with the rate control OFF and ON. The variation
in PSNR and bitrate under increasing payloads was observed and it was found
that the performance of the proposed system remain stable and does not degrade
significantly. The computational overhead involved as a result of embedding the
watermark was also evaluated and the observations showed that the total increase
was not more than 3% over the time taken by a “normal” H.264 encoder. Finally,
the proposed technique was compared with other similar techniques in terms of R-
D characteristics [88] and payload capacity [88,90].It was found that the proposed
technique exhibited better R-D characteristics while at the same time allowing
a payload capacity that was almost twice of the other two reported techniques.
Such a technique can be put to use in a number of applications such as Video-on-
Demand where the source could be authenticated before accepting a video stream.
After authentication and before commencing playback, the video could be restored
back to its original form.
In Chapter 7, the problem of DRM was looked at from a completely different
perspective. Rather than embedding additional information within the video and
then extracting it at the receiver side, the characteristics of the video itself were
utilized to generate a signature that would uniquely identify the video. In this
approach, a group of I-, B- and P-frames at the start of each GOP were divided
into 2×2 regions. Then the number of 4×4, B skip and P skip macroblocks were
counted within each region of each frame respectively. The values were then
sorted in an ordinal matrix in order to constitute a signature. Signatures were
extracted from a query video clip and matched against signatures extracted from
longer target video sequences. A distance parameter was calculated that measured
the similarity between two signatures. A distance value lesser than a pre-defined
threshold would indicate a match, and hence a copy. This method was tested on
a number of test video sequences encoded under the H.264 standard. “Copies” of
video sequences were generated by performing some of the most common video
editing operations. They included not only spatial but also temporal modifications
such as changes in luminance, contrast, frame rate change and motion blurring
etc. In total, 13 different types of video editing steps were performed in order
to generate copies. It was found that the method is capable of detecting,on an
average, 10 out of 13 copies even with a low detection sensitivity. In addition,
the technique was also capable of temporal localization which implies that the
technique was able to identify the location within a longer video sequence where
the copy existed. Analytically, the performance was evaluated by plotting an ROC
curve for false-positive and false-negative rates. The results indicated that the
technique provided optimum performance when the sequence matching length was
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50 frames. A query length lower or higher than this exhibited less than optimum
ROC characteristics. Another set of parameters used to evaluate CBCD based
systems was precision and recall. These factors were plotted against normalized
threshold values and again the technique reported satisfactory results. In fact,
when compared to two other similar methods reported in [49, 107], the proposed
technique exhibited a much higher precision rate while maintaining a comparable
recall rate. This proved that there were far less false detections. Even though
the precision and recall rates with a frame length of 30 were quite satisfactory
but in the light of the poor ROC curve obtained, the optimum performance of
the proposed technique was settled at a query length of 50 frames. Finally, the
computational efficiency of the technique was measured in terms of the time taken
to detect a copy. It was found that technique is very efficient and takes less than
half a second to identify a 50 frame query video in a target video sequence of
13,372 frames.
8.2 Suggestions and Future Work
There are a number of avenues that could be further explored within the techniques
proposed in this work. They range from improving only certain specific aspects
of an algorithm to a complete re-design. Some of the obvious avenues for further
exploration are:
1. The robust watermarking technique proposed in Chapter 4 can be re-
designed to make it self-contained. This essentially means that the key
(which is supplementary information) can be made a part of the payload.
Another possibility is to make the technique location-unaware. The frame-
work to design a location unaware watermark detection have already been
proposed in [109, 110]. A similar framework can be employed so that the
watermark detector need not know which DC residuals are actually carrying
the payload in order to extract the watermark
2. The fragile watermarking approach presented in Chapter 5, can be im-
proved by generalizing the choice of watermark embedding locations. Thus
every residual block can contain a watermark bit in not just the last coef-
ficient but in any of the last 3-4 coefficients. This will increase not just the
security of the algorithm but also make it resistant towards those categories
of attacks that attempt to completely obliterate the watermark.
3. The reversible watermarking approach presented in Chapter 6 can be con-
sidered to be only a basic design. There are several ways the technique can
be improved upon:
(a) Introducing a heuristic method that makes a more informed decision
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regarding which macroblock to encode as an IPCM macroblock. This
decision can be taken on the basis of the texture/detail/motion in-
formation contained within the macroblocks.
(b) The pixels can be paired using any pattern other than a simple ho-
rizontal or vertical pattern. This will improve the security of the
algorithm.
(c) Using B-frames in addition to P-frames to embed the payload. This
will naturally improve the payload capacity.
(d) Introducing a drift compensation module.
4. The copy detection method proposed in Chapter 7 can be improved by
including other macroblocks types that are generated by the H.264 en-
coder. They include the 8×8 macroblocks generated within the I-frame;
8×16, 16×8 macroblocks generated within the B- and P-frames etc. Using
different macroblocks types will provide a more accurate signature which
in turn can lead to a better performance. Further, a combination of the
count and intensity/DCT values within these macroblocks can also be used
to generate a spatiotemporal signature. However, whether it will improve
copy-detection performance still remains an open research problem.
5. The methods developed within this study can be combined together to
realize a more effective DRM system. For instance, the robust and fragile
watermarking methods can be combined to realize a hybrid watermarking
system. Such a system will be effective for both content protection and
content authentication. Similarly, a CBCD system can be combined with a
robust watermarking system. Such a system would first, be able to detect
a copy of the original video and then extract the robust watermark from
the copy in order to prove ownership.
Enforcing DRM especially on H.264 video is rapidly gaining attention both
within the academia and industry. This is mainly due to the rapid growth of
high-speed broadband and cellular networks which allows more and more users to
access and consume video content. This also means that unauthorized users and
pirates who have access to powerful tools and resources can easily copy, modify
and redistribute the video. It seems that the pirates are always a step ahead of the
latest DRM technology, thus newer and powerful techniques are always required
in order to protect digital video.
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